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ABSTRACT
Previous research has suggested that there are multiple psychological processes
underlying delusional thought. While it appears that cognitive biases in certain reasoning
and attention processes are related to delusion-proneness, the influence of emotion on
these processes is not well understood. The overall objective of this study was to
investigate the effect of emotional content on performance on tasks thought to measure
attentional bias, preferential recall, and probabilistic reasoning in individuals with
schizophrenia and demographically matched controls. In order to account for level of
delusion-proneness, participants also completed a multidimensional measure of
delusional thought. It was hypothesized that individuals with schizophrenia would
perform more poorly on both the emotional and neutral versions of these tasks compared
to controls. It was also hypothesized that within each group, there would be a statistically
significant emotion effect, indicated by a difference in performance on the emotional
(compared to neutral) condition of each task. This emotion effect was expected to be
larger in the schizophrenia group. Finally, it was hypothesized that the emotion effect
would increase as the severity of delusional proneness increased for all participants,
regardless of group. As hypothesized, the schizophrenia group performed more poorly on
the tasks overall, though expected emotion effects were generally absent. There were no
differences in the size of emotion effects between the groups on any of the cognitive
tasks administered, and the emotion effect did not appear to increase as severity of
delusion-proneness increased. Factors that may have contributed to this pattern of results
are discussed. Implications of these findings on theoretical models of delusions and
future directions for research in this area are also discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
“I am dead;” “aliens control my thoughts;” “the government has inserted a
microchip inside my brain.” These are all beliefs expressed by individuals experiencing
various types of delusions, representing the "Cotard" delusion, delusions of alien control,
and paranoid delusions, respectively (Coltheart, 2007; Ellett, Freeman, & Garety, 2007).
Delusions, broadly defined as fixed false beliefs, are prevalent among individuals with
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. More than 90% of schizophrenia patients
experience delusions at some point during the course of their illness (Cutting, 1995).
Additionally, delusions are often present in individuals with schizophrenia spectrum
disorders. While the study of delusions in individuals with schizophrenia and related
disorders has received the most attention in the research literature to date, the impact of
delusions is certainly not limited to that population. Delusions may also be part of the
symptom profile of individuals with mood disorders (e.g., bipolar disorder and major
depressive disorder with psychotic features), Alzheimer’s disease, and traumatic brain
injury.

Defining Delusions
Though the study of delusions has spanned almost two centuries, many issues are
still debated in the literature, including the precise definition of a delusion. The word
‘delusion’ has Latin roots, coming from the verb ludere, which means “to play.” This
particular conception of delusions refers to the observation that delusions are in many
ways akin to ‘tricks’ being played on the mind (Butcher, Mineka, and Hooley, 2007).

1

When it first entered the medical literature in the early 19th century, the term ‘delusion’
was synonymous with the more general term “madness,” and at that time referred to a
general deprivation of sense or lack of brightness (Hoff, 2006). The contemporary use of
the term can be traced to the work of Karl Jaspers, who is commonly credited as being
the first to formally define the concept of delusions in his book General Psychopathology
(Jaspers, 1913/1997). His definition would serve as the basis of the formal definition of
delusions according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM-IV-TR). According to the DSM-IV-TR, a delusion is a “false belief based
on incorrect inference about external reality and firmly sustained in spite of what almost
everybody else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof
or evidence to the contrary.” Additionally, criteria entail that the belief must not be
ordinarily accepted by other members of the belief holder’s culture or subculture
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
While this particular definition has its share of critics (e.g., Bell, Halligan, &
Ellis, 2006; Heinimaa, 2002; Leeser & O'Donohue, 1999; Spitzer, 1990), alternative
conceptualizations have not approached the definition offered by the DSM-IV-TR in
terms of their acceptance or use in the field of psychiatry or psychology. Nonetheless,
many of these criticisms warrant consideration. For example, Bell and colleagues make
two important points regarding the definition found in the DSM-IV-TR. First, they point
out that delusions might not necessarily be false beliefs per se, citing that a delusional
belief could be a value judgment, a statement that is not amenable to hypothesis testing,
or in fact turn out to be true. Secondly, they contend that the criterion that a delusion is
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not ordinarily accepted by members of a culture or subculture is typically not based on
empirical evidence of how widely accepted that belief may be (Bell et al., 2006).
In their critique of the epistemological criteria inherent in the definition proposed
by the DSM-IV-TR, Leeser and O’Donohue suggest that the primary defining feature of
delusions is not that they represent “false beliefs,” but rather, that they are “uniquely
unfalsifiable” beliefs (Leeser & O'Donohue, 1999). These authors posit that while the
traditional definition of delusions (rooted in Jaspers’ conceptualization) labels delusional
beliefs as those which are believed despite evidence to the contrary, many delusional
beliefs lack any clear empirical content, and thus cannot be shown to be false using any
empirical evidence. According to these authors, a belief may be unfalsifiable in principle,
or because the belief-holder refuses to admit to potential falsifiers; either way they argue
that this particular criterion is not suitable to define many beliefs that are in fact
delusional.
Recent attempts at defining delusions from interdisciplinary perspectives have
taken a more integrative approach to this challenge, frequently drawing on definitions
from various subfields such as psychology, psychiatry, and others. Some authors have
opted to propose broader guidelines or criteria rather than narrow definitions. For
example, based on common themes spanning several subfields, Gilleen and David
proposed that a delusional belief is one that is held with great conviction, defies rational
counter-argument, and is dismissed as false or bizarre by members of the same sociocultural group (Gilleen & David, 2005). These authors take a twofold approach to the
problem of defining delusions. While they acknowledge the difficulty in attempting to
come the ‘perfect’ definition, they recognize the practical importance of commonly

3

agreed upon guidelines for the purposes of recognizing and studying clinical phenomena.
These authors conclude by stating that “a more precise definition [of delusions] is
probably impossible since delusions are contextually dependent, multiply determined,
and multidimensional” (p. 5). Other researchers have gone beyond this view however,
going so far as to state that “manuals of psychiatry or clinical psychology offer
definitions of ‘delusion,’ but these turn out to be of little value for the scientific
investigation of delusional belief” (Coltheart, 2007, p. 1043).

The Debate Continues - Categorical versus Dimensional Approaches
While the debate regarding the definition of a delusion seems far from coming to
a close, another deliberation has been growing in the literature – the question of whether
delusions ought to be viewed from a categorical versus a dimensional approach. This
debate is not unique to the study of delusions or even psychosis; the same question has
been raised in regard to symptoms of mood disorders (Akiskal & Benazzi, 2006),
personality disorders (Trull, Tragesser, Solhan, & Schwartz-Mette, 2007), and other
categories of psychiatric illness. The traditional approach that has been taken in these
areas, including work on delusions, is the categorical approach. Within the literature on
psychosis, this approach views the presence of delusions as a defining symptom of
several psychotic disorders (e.g., schizophrenia). The absence of delusions, on the other
hand, may preclude one from being diagnosed with certain disorders, such as delusional
disorder. The pervasiveness of this view is evident not only in the DSM-IV-TR
definition, but in many of the diagnostic tools typically used to diagnose and classify
symptoms of psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Recently though, there has been
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a shift in the literature towards a more dimensional approach to characterizing delusions,
as well as a number of other symptoms of psychosis. This approach, while not new, has
received increasing attention in the past 10 to 20 years.
According to the dimensional perspective, symptoms of psychosis lie on a
continuum ranging from healthy, through eccentric, to floridly psychotic (Claridge,
1994). In terms of delusions, this view states that they are not “all-or-nothing” false
beliefs; instead delusional thought is present to some degree in both healthy and
psychiatric individuals. Recent work that supports this theory includes that of Peters and
colleagues, who measured delusional ideation in both a healthy population and a deluded
population and reported that almost 10% of the healthy population scored above the mean
of the deluded comparison group on a measure of delusion-proneness (Peters, Joseph, &
Garety, 1999a). This indicates not only that delusional thinking is evident in a healthy
community population, but that a small percentage of this group reported experiencing
higher levels than those of the deluded group.

Delusions from a Multidimensional Perspective
Expanding on the idea that delusions lie on a continuum, it has been suggested
that delusions themselves can be further broken down and conceptualized as
multidimensional. This idea was originally proposed by Strauss based on research that he
conducted on clinical inpatients with delusions. He proposed that there are three major
dimensions of delusional belief: conviction of the belief; preoccupation with the belief;
and distress related to the belief (Strauss, 1969). Since that time, a considerable amount
of work has been done lending support to this notion (Hanssen, Krabbendam, Vollema,
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Delespaul, & Van Os, 2006; Johns & van Os, 2001; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli,
2000; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). Expanding upon the work of Strauss, it has been
suggested that distinct dimensions of delusions may be better predictors of the presence
of psychotic illness over others. Based on their work investigating delusion proneness in
psychiatric individuals and non-psychiatric members of New Religious Movements,
Peters and colleagues concluded that the dimensions of distress and preoccupation
differentiated the two groups, while number of delusions endorsed and conviction of
delusional beliefs did not (Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 1999b). A study by Lincoln
reported similar findings: distress, as well as delusional content, best discriminated nonclinical controls from schizophrenia patients (Lincoln, 2007). Both of these findings are
in line with the dimensional perspective of psychosis, which contends that the experience
of symptoms such as delusions is not inevitably associated with the presence of a
disorder, rather, a myriad of other factors (e.g., pervasiveness of symptoms, frequency of
symptoms, symptom comorbidity) ultimately play a major role in determining whether or
not a given symptom is pathological (Johns & van Os, 2001). Along these lines, it has
been suggested that delusional beliefs may actually exist on a continuum between typical
worry, overvalued ideas, and delusions (O’Conner, 2009), and that what distinguishes
‘normal’ and psychotic experiences may be an individual’s metacognitions (e.g., what the
individual believes about a given belief).

Cognitive Approaches to Understanding Delusions
The influence of the continuum view of delusions is evident in the growing body
of literature aimed at identifying the psychological mechanisms underlying individual
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symptoms of psychosis. According to the continuum hypothesis, studying a pathological
symptom such as delusions in healthy individuals can enhance the understanding of
delusional thought in psychiatric individuals. Cognitive approaches to delusions, on the
other hand, have adopted the approach of studying the cognitive processes of healthy
individuals in psychiatric individuals in order to better understand how malfunctioning in
normal cognitive processes can lead to pathology.
Cognitive neuropsychiatry, a major subfield in this area, seeks to gain a deeper
understanding of the normal functioning of higher order aspects of cognition such as
belief formation by studying people in whom such processes are abnormal (Coltheart,
2007). According to Gilleen and David (2005), the aim of the cognitive neuropsychiatric
approach to delusional beliefs is to “construct theories of the normal stages involved in
belief-formation, and then show how malfunctions produce characteristic
psychopathology” (p. 6). This view posits that the mechanisms that lead to delusional
belief are not qualitatively different in individuals with clinical delusions; rather, the
same cognitive, emotional, and neurological processes are at work in these individuals,
they are simply operating in a disrupted or dysfunctional way, leading to the formation
and maintenance of clinical delusions. Whether addressing delusions or other psychiatric
symptoms, the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach focuses on symptoms rather than
diagnoses, as it is thought that the study of symptoms is more likely to elucidate
functional relationships as opposed to a broad diagnostic approach (Bell et al., 2006).
Other cognitive approaches have adopted a similar dimensional view.
As the name implies, most cognitive models of psychosis are anchored in some
way by the primacy of cognitive processes in the formation and maintenance of psychotic
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symptoms. A considerable amount of research has investigated the cognitive correlates of
psychosis. Much of this work has been done with schizophrenia patients, and overall it
appears that a diversity of cognitive impairments are pervasive and wide-ranging among
these individuals (Heinrichs, 2005). However, recent work suggests that within this
population, cognitive impairments may differ according to symptomatology. That is,
individuals with primarily positive symptoms (delusions and hallucinations) may display
different cognitive deficits than those with symptoms falling largely in the negative
symptom cluster (Rocca et al., 2006). Coupled with work investigating delusions in other
psychiatric disorders (e.g., delusional disorder), there is a growing body of literature
focusing exclusively on uncovering the mechanisms responsible for the manifestation
delusions. Though a full review of these theories is beyond the scope of this manuscript,
it is worth noting several models that are particularly relevant to understanding the key
cognitive processes underlying delusional thought.
One theme that appears in multiple theories of delusional thought is the role of
abnormal or anomalous experiences. According to Maher, dysfunction at the perceptual
level results in anomalous experiences for delusional individuals, who proceed to apply
normal processes of reasoning and rationality in order to explain these strange
experiences (Maher, 2005). Maher states that deficits in reasoning are not central to
distinguishing those with delusions and those without. However, others have argued for
the primacy of reasoning deficits in delusions. For instance, Gerrans has suggested that it
is the failure to apply normal rules of pragmatic reasoning or rationality (e.g., What
counts as good evidence? How are initial probabilities assigned to competing
hypotheses?) in the context of anomalous experiences that accounts for delusional
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thinking (Gerrans, 2001). An important distinction between these two ideas is the relative
importance assigned to lower-level processes of perception versus higher-order processes
such as reasoning. Recently, Fletcher and Frith (2009) proposed a framework for
understanding delusions based on a Bayesian approach of hierarchical prediction
modeling in the brain. This model narrows the gap between lower and higher-order
processes by accounting for how each process influences the other in a feedback loop that
leads to delusional beliefs. These authors suggest that prediction errors (a mismatch
between one’s expectations and one’s actual experiences), have influence at the lower
perceptual level, leading to anomalous experiences. Higher level processes, such as
reasoning, are then fed faulty input about these experiences, leading to faulty output (i.e.,
conclusions) that in turn exert influence on future prediction errors at the lower level
(Fletcher & Frith, 2009). This theory predicts that in time, the constant readjustments that
result from this feedback loop lead one beyond faulty conclusions about isolated
instances and form the basis for more global delusional beliefs.
While theories of delusions are becoming increasingly sophisticated, fundamental
questions about the cognitive processes that play a central role in delusional thought
remain unanswered. For example, despite the past 30 years worth of research on the
subject, it does not appear that the basic question of whether individuals with delusions
reason differently than those without (including both ‘normal’ controls and nondelusional psychiatric patients) has been definitively answered (Mujica-Parodi et al.,
2000). This is not to suggest that considerable progress has not been made in the search
of relevant processes to focus on. Bell et al. (2006) identified the following overarching
areas of investigation as critical to the understanding of delusions: probabilistic
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reasoning, attributional style, attention, and metacognition. Guided by these findings, and
in light of the recent trend to focus on individual symptoms, the following review will
focus on literature that specifically addressed the construct of delusions and/or
distinguished participant groups based on delusional status.

Cognitive Correlates of Delusional Thought
Cognitive biases can be defined as impaired thought processes that occur as a
result of one’s experiences and which lead one to notice, pay attention to, or recall some
types of information better than others. This in turn may bias one’s interpretation of
subjective experiences (Klewchuk, McCusker, Mulholland, & Shannon, 2007). Biased
cognitive processes concerned with reasoning and attention have been the focus of much
of the literature on the cognitive correlates of delusions. Broadly speaking, attention and
delusional thought could theoretically be linked in numerous ways. For instance, it is
possible that individuals with delusions selectively attend to information perceived as
threatening or related in some way to a preexisting delusional belief, a theory that was
first proposed by Ullmann and Krasner in 1969 (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood,
& Kinderman, 2001). Reasoning processes have also been implicated as being directly
involved in delusional thinking processes. Deficits in inductive and deductive ‘formal’
logical reasoning in delusional individuals appear to have been the focus of early studies
in this area (Mujica-Parodi, Malaspina, & Sackeim, 2000). As this area has grown,
interest in tasks thought to reflect ‘everyday’ reasoning ability, such as quickness of
decision making under conditions of uncertainty, has increased.
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Delusions and Reasoning Processes
Reasoning can be defined as “a combination of cognitive processes that allows us
to draw inferences from a given set of information and reach conclusions that are not
explicitly available, providing new knowledge” (Canessa et al., 2005, p. 30). One of the
first researchers to formalize a theory on reasoning processes in psychotic individuals
was Von Domarus, who stated that individuals with schizophrenia reason in an organized
fashion but follow different rules of logic, leading to faulty conclusions (Mujica-Parodi et
al., 2000). Though his original study investigating deductive logic in schizophrenia
patients was conducted in 1944 (Von Domarus, 1944), few published studies appeared in
this field within the next 30 years or so. However, since the 1970’s, more studies have
appeared which aim to investigate logic and/or reasoning abilities in psychotic
individuals.
Numerous studies have reported information processing biases related to
reasoning in both individuals with delusions (Garety et al., 2005; Garety, Hemsley, &
Wessely, 1991; Langdon, Ward, & Colthart, 2008; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Ross,
Freeman, Dunn, & Garety, 2009; Van Dael et al., 2006) and those who are delusionprone (Broome et al., 2007; Colbert & Peters, 2002; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart,
2006; Linney, Peters, & Ayton, 1998; White & Mansell, 2009). Often referred to as the
‘jumping-to-conclusions’ (JTC) data gathering bias, this occurs when individuals utilize
less information when coming to conclusions during reasoning tasks requiring judgment
under uncertain conditions. Specifically, it is thought that individuals with delusions have
a tendency to gather less evidence before making inferences, and it is this bias toward
gathering less data that leads one to jump to conclusions while performing reasoning
tasks (Garety & Freeman, 1999). In the literature, this has typically been demonstrated by
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having participants perform a task which requires them to guess the probability that
‘randomly’ drawn colored beads come from one jar of beads over the other, based on the
ratio of colored beads in each jar. Inferring that beads are being drawn from one jar as
opposed to the other on the basis of very little evidence (few beads in this case) is
indicative of a JTC reasoning style.
Since the first report of the JTC data gathering bias in individuals with delusions
(Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988), a number of studies have investigated the stability,
specificity, and influence of alternate task paradigms on this finding. In order to
investigate specificity, Peters et al. administered reasoning tasks to a group of psychiatric
patients and then divided this group in two ways: 1) based on whether or not they were
deluded; and 2) based on whether or not they were diagnosed with schizophrenia.
Deluded patients were found to exhibit a JTC data-gathering bias, but no differences were
found when patients were grouped by diagnosis. These findings led to the conclusion that
the JTC bias appeared to be specific to delusional status (Peters, Thornton, Siksou,
Linney, & Maccabe, 2007). Adding support to this point, Corcoran and colleagues
investigated the JTC task in individuals with paranoid delusions (PD) across several
groups including: current psychotic disorder (schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and
delusional disorder), current affective disorder (depression), and remitted psychotic
disorder. These authors reported that all three groups demonstrated the JTC bias,
regardless of diagnosis. They concluded that this particular cognitive tendency is a
transdiagnosotic feature in individuals with PD (Corcoran et al., 2007).
In order to determine whether the presence of the JTC bias represents an
underlying deficit in reasoning ability related to information gathering, rather than a
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generalized reasoning deficit, Peters et al. (2007) administered the JTC task and two of
the classic Wason reasoning tasks to individuals in the above described study. The Wason
selection task is thought to measure conditional reasoning (e.g. ‘if p then q’), while
Wason’s 2-4-6 task measures confirmation bias, or a tendency to interpret new
information in a way that confirms preconceptions. These authors reported that while
there were no group differences on tasks of general reasoning ability, individuals in the
delusion group performed more poorly on the JTC task. They concluded that reasoning
deficits in the delusion group appeared to be specific to those measured by the JTC task,
rather than representing a generalized deficit in reasoning across tasks (Peters et al.,
2007). The point has also been made that, although the relationship between the JTC bias
and other well established cognitive impairments in schizophrenia (e.g., memory,
executive functioning) is not yet fully understood, the JTC bias differs from those
impairments because it appears to be specific to delusional thought (Ross et al., 2009).
Stability of the JTC bias during periods of symptom remission has also been
investigated. In a longitudinal study of the JTC bias in individuals with delusions, it has
been reported that this bias is present at follow-up (these individuals did not undergo
specific treatment for the JTC bias). The authors of this study concluded that the JTC bias
is thus a stable factor associated with delusional thinking (Peters & Garety, 2006). In a
study that investigated the effect of a training session to modify the JTC bias by
enhancing reasoning strategies in individuals with delusions, it was reported that
participants requested more information before reaching a decision on the JTC task
subsequent to training compared to the no training group (Ross et al., 2009). These
authors also reported a modest effect on metacognitions about one’s own delusional
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thoughts in the training group compared to the no training group, though this difference
was not statistically significant in their small sample. These authors concluded that a
change in data gathering and reasoning techniques might mediate a change in delusional
thinking, though they stressed that this conclusion was tentative (Ross et al., 2009).
While there is now strong support for the existence of the JTC data-gathering bias
in individuals with delusions compared to controls (Garety & Freeman, 1999), certain
factors may influence the consistency and strength associated with this finding. For
instance, it was reported that while individuals with delusional disorder did show a JTC
reasoning style when compared to controls, when performing on a task that added
consequences to their decisions, this difference disappeared (Fear & Healy, 1997). Other
researchers have reported that increasing memory demands of the task results in larger
differences between deluded individuals and controls (Menon, Pomarol-Clotet,
McKenna, & McCarthy, 2006). Task difficulty may also influence performance on this
task, as some studies have found that altering the ratio of beads from 85:15 to 60:40
improves performance in individuals with delusions (presumably because participants
become more cautious in their estimations), while others have failed to replicate this
finding (Ziegler et al., 2008).
One important factor that has only recently received attention in the literature is
the emotional salience of the task. While the traditional JTC beads task is considered
emotionally neutral, versions have been developed that introduce an emotional
component to the task. These paradigms may ask participants to make judgments under
uncertainty on tasks where they are read positive and negative statements, and must
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decide which list (containing different ratios of positive and negative statements) these
statements originated from (Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997b).
In what appears to be the first study to investigate this relationship, Dudley and
colleagues (1997b) found support for the hypothesis that emotional salience impacts the
JTC bias. These authors reported a reduction in the amount of evidence participants
requested before coming to a conclusion while performing an emotional JTC task.
However, this finding was not exclusive to their group with delusions; it was also evident
in individuals with other psychiatric disorders, as well as controls. In a study by Warman
and colleagues, three groups (individuals with delusions, delusion-prone individuals, and
controls) were compared on their performance on two tasks: a neutral and a highly selfreferent (emotional) JTC task. The findings from this study indicated that those with
clinical delusions gathered significantly less information than both comparison groups on
both of the tasks. They also made less accurate decisions than both groups but were more
confident in their decisions. On both of those measures, the delusion-prone group did not
differ from the control group. However, both the deluded and delusion-prone groups
reported higher self-confidence on the emotional task compared to their own performance
on the neutral version of the same task (control participants did not differ by task),
suggesting that high self-reference impacted information processing in these groups
(Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis, & Haudenschield, 2007).
An alternate method of investigating the impact of emotion on the JTC bias by
inducing state anxiety has been reported in a small number of recent studies. It appears
that two of these investigations included individuals with delusions. Ellett et al. (2007)
exposed individuals with persecutory delusions to either an anxiety invoking situation

15

(exposure to a busy urban environment), or a mindfulness task designed to reduce
anxiety. These authors reported that subsequent to exposure, participants in the anxiety
inducing condition displayed a more pronounced JTC bias compared to the anxiety
reducing condition. In a study investigating the JTC bias in individuals with delusions
and healthy controls, anxiety was induced via a mental imagery paradigm. Results from
this investigation indicated that there was no difference between the groups on the JTC
task, however authors pointed out that the anxiety induction technique did not appear to
be successful in the delusion group, and both groups displayed unusually high rates of the
JTC bias (So, Freeman, & Garety, 2008).
In a study investigating treatment for delusions with antipsychotic medication, the
JTC task was administered pre- and post-treatment in order to explore whether task
performance mediated or moderated changes in symptom levels between the testing
periods. Both a neutral and emotional version of the task was administered to individuals
with psychosis before and after treatment with antipsychotic medication. Results
indicated that, post-treatment, participants required more information (considered an
improvement) before making a decision on the emotional JTC task (but not the neutral
version). It was also reported that baseline performance on the emotional JTC task helped
predict which patients showed improvement in their positive symptoms post-treatment.
These authors found that while JTC performance did not mediate the effects of treatment
on symptomatology, it may have moderated that relationship (Menon, Mizrahi, & Kapur,
2008).
Research investigating other reasoning biases has further elucidated the nature of
reasoning processes in individuals with delusions, therefore a brief review of this work
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follows. Attributional reasoning refers to a tendency to attribute ambiguous events to an
internal cause (oneself) versus some external cause, such as another person (Bentall et al.,
2001). The first study to investigate this bias in individuals with schizophrenia
(specifically those with persecutory delusions) reported that these individuals tend to
excessively attribute positive events to internal causes and negative events to external
causes as compared to individuals with depression and normal control participants
(Kaney & Bentall, 1989). The finding that individuals with persecutory delusions display
this characteristic bias in attributional styles (often referred to as an exaggerated
externalizing bias, or EB) has been replicated (Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Bentall, Kaney, &
Dewey, 1991; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Candido & Romney, 1990;
Kinderman & Bentall, 1997; Kinderman, Prince, Waller, & Peters, 2003). Other
researchers, however, have failed to find an EB in individuals with persecutory delusions
(Martin & Penn, 2002; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005), or in some cases have
reported partial support for an abnormal attributional bias that is not specific to
persecutory delusions (Humphreys & Barrowclough, 2006). Though the theory that
attributional reasoning biases contribute to delusional thought has amassed considerable
support, more work is clearly needed to determine whether this reasoning bias
generalizes to all subtypes of delusional thought or is specific to persecutory delusions.
Another area of interest in the literature on reasoning and delusions is the
investigation of the relationship between delusions and deficits in processing evidence.
The ability to correctly process confirmatory evidence to support a belief, coupled with
the ability to integrate evidence that disconfirms an erroneous thought, appears to be
important to the overall question of how normal beliefs are formed and maintained
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(Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). A deficit in the ability to
integrate disconfirmatory evidence into previously held beliefs is known as a bias against
disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and it has been suggested that individuals with
delusions routinely disregard evidence that disconfirms their delusional thought in order
for delusional beliefs to be maintained (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, &
Bebbington, 2002). The presence of a BADE has been reported in schizophrenia patients
with delusions (Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006), and individuals who are
delusion-prone (Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007). Addiitonally, it has been
reported that a BADE does not appear to be due to more generalized reasoning or
cognitive (e.g., attention) deficits (Moritz & Woodward, 2006; Woodward et al., 2006).
Taken together, research investigating reasoning biases, including JTC, an exaggerated
externalizing bias, and a BADE highlight the importance of understanding reasoning
processes in individuals with delusions.

Delusions and Attentional Bias
The study of general attention deficits in individuals with schizophrenia
encompasses a vast amount of research spanning decades. Within the literature on
delusions and other positive symptoms of psychosis (e.g., hallucinations), the study of
attentional biases has become a focus only recently. Attentional bias has been
investigated both as a primary process of interest, and as a lower level process
contributing to higher level functions, such as reasoning (Barch & Carter, 1998). In a
recent study evaluating performance on numerous neuropsychological domains
(including attention, memory, perceptual-motor speed and other executive processes) in
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individuals with schizophrenia, only the attentional deficit domain was correlated with
positive symptoms (Rocca et al., 2006). However, it should be noted that these authors
did not assess reasoning ability.
In broad terms, attentional bias refers to a tendency to devote more or less
attentional resources toward particular stimuli due to the relative importance of those
stimuli. According to Yantis, stimuli that gets selected by the attentional system at any
given moment is determined by 1) the properties of the scene; and 2) the expectations,
beliefs, and goals of the observer (Yantis, 1996). Attentional bias may result from any
number of deficits or differences in attention capacity, for example, increased time taken
to disengage from a particular stimuli perceived as threatening is a type of attentional bias
(Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001).
Attentional bias has been widely studied in both mood (Leppanen, 2006) and
anxiety disorders (Bishop, 2007). Recently however, it has been argued that the study of
attentional biases is critical in individuals with schizophrenia based on the interactive
effects of attentional biases coupled with other deficits common in psychotic individuals,
such as a tendency to gather little information before reaching strong conclusions (Moritz
& Laudan, 2007). According to these authors (2007), the combination of both scarce and
affectively biased data selection of available information may distort inner
representations, prompting the formation of false beliefs, thus contributing to delusion
formation and maintenance.
In individuals with delusions, attentional biases may be present across numerous
task modalities, including visual and auditory domains. Various task paradigms that have
been used to measure these abilities include vigilance tasks (e.g., visual scanning of

19

faces), selective attention tasks (e.g., variants of the Stroop task), as well as
attention/working memory tasks (e.g., word list tasks). Work in this area has attempted to
analyze attentional differences both in individuals with clinical delusions and those
identified as delusion-prone.
In a several studies of individuals reporting high levels of delusion-proneness,
biased attention toward angry and threatening faces has been reported (Arguedas, Green,
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006; Green, Williams, & Davidson, 2003a; Green, Williams, &
Davidson, 2001; Laroi, D'Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2006). Some of these studies
also investigated recognition memory for affective faces as well. While Green and
colleagues (2003a) reported impaired affect recognition of fear faces in delusion-prone
individuals, Laroi et al. (2006) reported enhanced memory (indicative of an attentional
bias) toward angry faces in their sample of delusion-prone individuals. Attentional bias
toward threatening faces has also been investigated in individuals with delusions. In a
study comparing deluded and non-deluded schizophrenia patients, it was reported that
visual scanning patterns of deluded patients reflected an attentional bias away from
salient features of faces signifying direct threat (anger), and more general avoidance of
faces signifying indirect threat (fear) expressions (Green, Williams, & Davidson, 2003b).
Another paradigm for investigating visual attentive bias in individuals with
delusions is the inhibition of return (IOR) paradigm developed by Mortiz and Laudan
(2007). These authors had two groups of individuals with schizophrenia (divided by the
presence or absence of paranoid delusions) complete a task requiring them to view cue
pictures, some of which were paranoia-relevant, on either side of the computer screen.
Following the picture display, individuals saw a target appear at the same or opposite
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location, and had to indicate where the target was. Participants responded faster to targets
following paranoia scenes, regardless of delusional status. These authors concluded that
the attentional bias toward paranoia cues displayed by individuals with schizophrenia
facilitated the processing of subsequent information processing (Moritz & Laudan, 2007).
It has been suggested that if individuals with delusions show attentional biases
toward particular (e.g. threat-related) stimuli, they might tend to preferentially recall this
information as well (Bentall, Kaney, & Jones-Bowen, 1995). These authors tested this
theory across three groups: individuals with persecutory delusions, individuals with
depression, and controls, all of whom performed a word recall task. Word lists contained
threat-related, depression-related, and emotionally neutral words, which participants were
instructed to recall immediately following presentation. These authors reported that
patients with delusions recalled fewer words overall compared to normal participants, and
showed a bias toward recall of threat words (a bias not displayed by the depressed group)
and depression words (as did depressed patients). The delusion group also showed a
unique tendency to repeat threat-related words during recall (Bentall et al., 1995). These
results were somewhat consistent with a previous study that reported increased recall of
threatening propositions from stories that contained threatening and non-threatening
themes by deluded patients compared to control participants. However, in this study,
there was no evidence that the deluded group had an abnormal tendency to recall
threatening stories as a whole compared to non-threatening stories (Kaney, Wolfenden,
Dewey, & Bentall, 1992).
An alternative way to investigate attentional biases is by using tasks during which
inhibition of automatic or prepotent attentional features is required for efficient task
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performance. The emotional Stroop task is one such task. This task is regarded as the
principle research tool for investigating attentional biases (Wells & Matthews, 1996). The
emotional Stroop task is a variant of the more well-known classic Stroop paradigm,
during which color words are presented in congruent (the color “red” in red ink) or
incongruent (the color “red” in green ink) ink, and participants must name the ink color
of the word. The phenomenon whereby it takes longer for healthy participants to name
the ink color in the incongruent condition has been dubbed the “Stroop effect,” and is
thought to be due to the cognitive interference created by suppressing one’s habitual
response to read words in favor of the non-habitual response of naming the ink color
(MacLeod, 1991).
The original version of the Stroop task places demands on selective attention, as
well as other executive functioning processes such as conflict response monitoring and
response inhibition (Gruber, Rogowska, Holcomb, Soraci, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2002). The
emotional Stroop task is based on the same general premise, and the administration of the
two variants is practically identical. However, instead of color words, the emotional
Stroop task utilizes emotionally salient words (e.g. positive or negatively valenced
words) and neutral words in order to assess the extent to which emotional stimuli
captures attentional resources (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The task is
thought to measure selective attention to emotionally relevant stimuli by contrasting the
extra time it takes to name the ink color during trials involving emotionally salient words
compared to trials of neutral words (Thomas, Johnstone, & Gonsalvez, 2007). Notably
different from the classic Stroop task, this task places less demands on conflict response
monitoring, as it is more difficult to name the ink color of a conflicting color word
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(classic task) as opposed to a word unrelated to color. Common to both paradigms,
however, one must still suppress the habitual reading response.
Emotional Stroop interference has been found across a wide range of different
clinical conditions (Williams et al., 1996). In the first study utilizing this task paradigm
with individuals with persecutory delusions, four ‘word’ lists were used: meaningless
strings of “O’s, neutral words, negative words, and paranoia words. The authors of this
study reported that individuals with paranoid delusions displayed increased reaction time
(indicating increased interference) when processing paranoia words (Bentall & Kaney,
1989). Similar results were reported in a subsequent study investigating emotional Stroop
interference in individuals with persecutory delusions, individuals with depression, and
healthy controls. Individuals with paranoid delusions were found to take longer to color
name words with either a positive or negative valence compared to controls (Kinderman,
1994). In a study of individuals with delusional disorder, it was reported that participants
demonstrated greater interference for threatening words compared to controls (Fear,
Sharpy, & Healy, 1996b). Interestingly, these authors found that individuals within the
delusion group with non-persecutory delusions also showed increased interference for
other types of emotionally salient words (anxiety and sadness words) compared to
controls.
In a variation of this classic emotional Stroop paradigm, the emotional Stroop task
was used as an experimental manipulation of attentional bias to different sources of threat
in individuals with persecutory delusions, those with depression, and a healthy control
group. All groups completed a measure of self-concept (containing 30 negative and 30
positive words rating self-concept) before and after the Stroop task. Before the Stroop
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task, there were no statistically significant differences on the self-concept measure
between the groups, however, following administration of the emotional Stroop task,
individuals in the deluded group showed a statistically significant discrepancy on selfconcept ratings (self-concept was rated more negatively) compared to the two other
groups (Kinderman et al., 2003). These findings suggest that the activation of attentional
biases present in individuals with persecutory delusions influences other reasoning
biases.
While there is a small body of research investigating emotional Stroop
performance in individuals with persecutory delusions, there appears to be less work
investigating individuals with other types of delusions. In a case study of an individual
with delusional beliefs that she had died (Cotard delusion) and that members of her
family had been replaced (Capgras delusion), it was reported that on an initial emotional
Stroop task, she displayed an attentional bias toward words related to her delusional
beliefs. Once those beliefs remitted, she no longer displayed any difference between
neutral words and words relevant to her previously held delusional beliefs (Leafhead,
1996). Based on this study, the emotional Stroop task appears to be similarly useful for
investigating attentional bias in individuals with other subtypes of delusions beyond
persecutory type.
Taken together, the research on attention biases in delusion-prone and delusional
individuals supports the theory of an attentional bias, particularly in the presence of
stimuli that is salient in some way to these individuals. However, the pattern of such a
bias (e.g. whether attention is directed toward or away from salient stimuli) is not clear,
even in cases when tasks may be very similar (e.g. in tasks assessing attention toward
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threatening faces). Furthermore, the impact of attentional bias in individuals with
delusions remains unclear. On particular laboratory-based tasks, an attentional bias may
be helpful, such as in the case of increased task efficiency following paranoia cues
reported by Mortiz and Laudan (2007); conversely, an attentional bias toward threatening
stimuli could impair performance when preferential attention to such stimuli is not
relevant to the task at hand, such as during performance on an emotional Stroop task.
While attentional bias has become an important area of research into cognitive
processes in individuals with delusions (Rossell, Shapleske, & David, 1998), there
appears to be a relative paucity of work investigating attentional bias in individuals
across a range of delusions. As evidenced from the above review, there is a growing body
of work focusing on persecutory delusions and the construct of paranoia, which makes
sense considering the prevalence of this subtype of delusional beliefs. However, the
generalizability of these findings to other types of delusions is somewhat limited.
Additionally, while there is a significant body of research investigating a wide range of
attentional processes in individuals with schizophrenia, the application of these findings
towards an understanding of the theoretical mechanisms underlying delusional thought is
limited. Despite these limitations, findings concerning attentional biases in individuals
with delusions do point to a number of specific areas of inquiry for further research. One
of these areas is the importance of emotion. Inherent to the study of attentional bias is the
influence of the saliency of the material attended to (or ignored). It has been suggested
that emotion and cognition appear to be necessary to both information processing and the
implementation of resultant behaviors in those behaviors essential for attention (Wolfe &
Bell, 2007).
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In reviewing the literature investigating the cognitive reasoning biases related to
delusional beliefs, several trends are apparent. It has become increasingly accepted to
investigate cognitive processes related to delusions both in clinical populations and in
delusion-prone non-psychiatric individuals. Increased attention on specific cognitive
processes such as reasoning and attention biases, as opposed to more generalized
cognitive deficits, is also evident. Additionally, the role of other psychological processes
is increasingly being recognized, especially the possible influence of affective processes
as they relate to cognitive functions such as reasoning and attention.

The Role of Emotion in Cognitive Models of Delusional Thought
While cognitive dysfunction is clearly a cardinal feature of schizophrenia, and is
evidently related to delusion-proneness as well, some researchers have argued that the
role of emotional dysfunction in symptom formation and maintenance may be just as
important (Aleman & Kahn, 2005). According to Garety and colleagues (2007),
emotional processes appear to have a distinct role in the formation and maintenance of
delusions, however, this role has received considerably less attention than that of the
cognitive correlates. Their model, as well as other cognitive models of psychosis, has
increasingly pointed to the importance of emotions as directly contributing to the
development of delusions, the content and themes of delusions, and the treatment of
delusions. While the line of research recognizing the potential contributory role of
emotion in the delusional process is quite new, there are already competing models
aiming to explain the mechanisms by which cognitive and emotional factors contribute to
delusional thought.
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The cognitive model of psychosis developed by Garety and colleagues is notable
for stressing a multifactorial account of the formation and maintenance of delusions
(Garety et al., 2001). The framework presented by these authors incorporates the
cognitive, emotional, social, and neurobiological correlates of delusions, with an
emphasis on understanding how these factors interact in a way that results in pathological
delusional thought. Influenced by the dimensional approach to delusions, these authors
propose that the presence of psychotic experiences does not independently predict
transition to psychosis, instead, there are specific cognitive and emotional factors
working in combination that encourage the emergence of a clinical disorder (Garety et
al., 2007). In their recent review covering cognitive models of psychosis (which
encompass both delusions and hallucinations), these authors present support for the
following hypotheses: 1) symptoms of psychosis lie on a continuum of normal
functioning; 2) cognitive reasoning biases contribute to the occurrence of delusions; 3)
these biases may represent risk factors for the transition from subclinical to clinical
symptoms; 4) emotional processes contribute to the occurrence and persistence of
psychotic features; and 5) social adversity and trauma are associated with psychosis
(Garety et al., 2007).
Garety et al.’s model is primarily concerned with delusions commonly seen in
individuals with psychotic disorders, including but not limited to persecutory delusions,
grandiose delusions, delusions of reference, and other less common subtypes (e.g.
jealousy delusions). These authors suggest that the most common route to positive
symptoms such as delusions is through cognitive and affective changes that are triggered
by external events. The interpretation of these events is influenced by disruptions in
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cognitive processes of attention and reasoning, which are in turn influenced by emotional
changes feeding back into the moment-by-moment processing of these experiences
(Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). For example, imagine that an
individual sees a car parked outside his house. If this individual displays a cognitive
reasoning bias like the JTC bias, he may interpret this to mean that someone in the car is
watching him. The emotional implications of this interpretation may include feelings of
fear and anxiety. These affective processes then feed back into further cognitive
appraisals about the situation, potentially leading the individual to additional conclusions,
for example, he may think that the intent of the individual watching him is to harm him in
some way. This simple example only addresses one reasoning bias that may be present
and ignores the role of other important factors thought to contribute to delusions,
however, numerous reasoning biases (e.g. externalizing attributional bias,
disconfirmation bias) and other cognitive deficits (e.g. attention deficits) may be present
in reality.
In the model of delusions proposed by Garety and colleagues, these authors argue
that emotion plays a direct role in the development of delusions via the influence of
affective processes on cognitive appraisals. Alternatively, it has been suggested that
delusions actually serve a defensive role against the experience of negative emotions. The
defense model of delusions, as it is known, states that when there is the potential for
negative self-beliefs to become activated, delusions defend against this by serving as an
external source with which to attribute those negative appraisals (Bentall et al., 1991;
Bentall et al., 1994). This model was developed primarily to account for persecutory
delusions in paranoid individuals. Early conceptions of this model suggested that the
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main cognitive reasoning process at the heart of this theory is attributional style. For
example, if an individual loses her job there is the potential that she may attribute this
event to negative characteristics about herself (an internal attribution). According to the
defense model however, she may instead conclude that her boss is out to get her (an
external attribution), thus defending against dealing with negative attributions directed at
herself. Recently, the authors of this model conducted a large scale investigation of
cognitive and emotional processes in individuals with paranoid delusions with the aim of
distinguishing which variables best predicted delusions. These authors reported that
paranoid delusions were associated with a combination of pessimistic thinking style,
including pessimistic explanatory style and negative emotion, and impaired cognitive
performance, including the JTC bias and impaired ability to reason about the mental
states of others. Interestingly, these authors also pointed out that emotion-related
processes were more closely linked with paranoid delusions than cognitive performance
in their investigation (Bentall et al., 2009).
Although they present different mechanisms by which emotion influences
delusions, both the direct and defense models address the importance of the role of affect
on cognitive processes. These models also share considerable overlap in terms of the
theoretical underpinning cited to support them, as well as other cognitive models not
mentioned here. One influential theory that has shaped both models is the idea that
psychotic and emotional disorders are not discrete clusters of disorders; rather, it has been
argued that disorders of emotion and psychotic disorders actually share considerable
overlap. According to Lake’s recent review of the area, this argument can be traced back
to the work of Emil Kraepelin, who initially differentiated ‘dementia praecox’ (later
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renamed schizophrenia) from ‘manic-depressive insanity’ (Lake, 2007). However, this
sharp distinction, which is reflected in ‘gold standard’ diagnostic instruments, such as the
DSM-IV-TR (2000), has been questioned by Lake and others (Craddock & Owen, 2005;
Lake, 2007; Marneros, 2006). This question has been echoed in the body of literature that
has focused on the relationship between emotional disturbance and the positive
symptoms of psychosis, including delusions. It has been argued that a lack of empirical
evidence to support a sharp distinction between these constructs, coupled with data
supporting the relationship between emotion and positive symptoms of psychosis
suggests that disorders of emotion and psychosis should no longer be theoretically
separated (Freeman & Garety, 2003).
Another theme that appears in the delusion literature that has influenced
theoretical perspectives suggesting the importance of emotion in delusional thought
processes is the finding that the content of delusions frequently reflects the content of an
individual’s affective state (Freeman & Garety, 2003). For instance, persecutory
delusions - which often contain themes of being followed or threatened - are thought to
be linked to anxiety (Freeman, 2007). All of the major emotions, including anxiety,
depression, anger, happiness, disgust, and jealousy, correspond to different subtypes of
delusions. For instance, happiness is thought to relate to grandiose delusions, while
depression is thought to relate to guilt delusions (Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-Butler, &
Maguire, 2005; Freeman & Garety, 2003). Of course, there are subtypes of delusions
(e.g. religious delusions) that do not correspond directly to any one emotion, which may
indicate that not all cases of delusion relate directly to emotional concern (Freeman &
Garety, 2003). Furthermore, while most delusions present in individuals experiencing
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mood disorders with psychotic features are found to be mood-congruent (77.4%), a
significant proportion of individuals report experiencing mood-incongruent or mixed
delusions (Fennig, Bromet, Karant, Ram, & Jandorf, 1996). Thus, it appears that while all
major emotions appear to be reflected in some delusion subtype, not all subtypes
necessarily reflect emotions, at least not in a clear manner. Clearly, more work is needed
to establish the role of emotion in delusion formation beyond the observed relationship
between delusion content and affective state.
Finally, recent work has investigated the relationship between emotional states
and dimensions of delusions, although most of this work is too recent to have made a
significant impact on cognitive models of delusions per se. Smith and colleagues
examined the role of current levels of depression, self-esteem, and negative evaluative
beliefs in relation to both delusion subtypes and dimensions of delusional belief.
Subtypes of interest included both grandiose and persecutory delusions, and within each
type, dimensions of pre-occupation, conviction, and distress were examined. These
authors reported that individuals with higher levels of depression, lower self-esteem, and
more negative evaluations reported persecutory delusions of greater severity and were
more preoccupied and distressed by them. Additionally, it was reported that the severity
of grandiose delusions was associated with higher self-esteem and inversely related to
depression and negative evaluations about the self (Smith et al., 2006). This work
provides further support for theoretical models suggesting a contributory role (i.e.
emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient) of emotions in delusional thought (Freeman
& Garety, 2003). Additionally, this work suggests that emotion may differentially
influence discrete dimensions of delusional thought, namely severity, preoccupation, and
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distress, though more research is needed in order to clarify this putative relationship.
Taken together with theoretical models suggesting that the influence of emotion on
delusional thought may depend on a number of factors, including delusion subtype, a
multifaceted model of the relationship between emotions and delusions is emerging.
However, this model will likely remain incomplete without taking into account how
emotions may influence cognitive processes thought to contribute to delusion formation
and maintenance, particularly attention and reasoning.

Emotional Dysfunction in Schizophrenia and Delusions
Certainly, the suggestion that dysfunctional emotional processes are present in
psychotic individuals is not new. It has previously been established that emotional
deficits are a core feature of schizophrenia. Three major deficit areas have been
identified: emotional perception, emotional experience, and emotional expression
(Aleman & Kahn, 2005). Within each of these domains, numerous deficits and
differences have been reported, including impaired emotional facial recognition (Namiki
et al., 2007) and deficits in emotional expression (Burbridge & Barch, 2007). In terms of
psychotic symptoms such as delusions, the literature suggests that an increase in
emotional experience coupled with a diminished ability in emotion perception is a
common pattern in these individuals (Aleman & Kahn, 2005).
While the body of literature investigating emotion processing in psychotic
individuals is too extensive to cover here, many authors in this field have adopted the
strategy of investigating the relationship of emotion processing deficits with other
psychological processes of interest (e.g. Pinkham & Penn, 2006). For instance, these
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authors have proposed the term ‘social cognition’ to encompass other aspects of
cognition that are not typically assessed using traditional neurocognitive tasks but that are
potentially important to emotional and social dysfunction seen in individuals with
schizophrenia (Pinkham, Penn, Perkins, & Lieberman, 2003). Research on functional
outcome in schizophrenia has also encouraged the trend to increase attention towards the
influence of emotional processes, as it has been reported that emotion deficits may be
better predictors of social dysfunction than cognitive deficits (Aleman & David, 2006).
Though core symptoms of psychosis, such as cognitive and social dysfunction,
are increasingly being related to deficits in emotional processing (Kuipers et al., 2006),
many questions remain unanswered to date. For instance, the nature of the relationship
between emotional deficits and other symptoms is still not clear. In regards to delusions,
it has been pointed out by Garety et al. (2005) that “at present, it is an open question
whether the contributions of reasoning and emotional processes to delusional severity are
independent or act in combination (p. 374).”Also, questions of causality abound. More
than half a century ago, Bleuler argued that in psychotic individuals, weakened reasoning
processes allowed emotions to take hold of the individual, thus manifesting themselves in
delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2003). Alternatively, it is possible that there is a core
deficit that leads to impaired reasoning, dysfunctional emotional responses, and other
cognitive and emotional deficits associated with psychosis.
If there are multiple pathways to delusional thought, as suggested by a number of
researchers, it is critical not only to identify each pathway, but to understand how these
pathways interact. The confluence of cognition and emotion may arguably be the most
important pathway leading to delusional formation and maintenance. It has been
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previously suggested (in relation to the study of psychotic symptoms) that “emotion and
cognition are best thought of as separate but interacting mental functions mediated by
separate but interacting brain systems” (Aleman & Kahn, 2005, p. 284). According to this
perspective, understanding the role of just one aspect is not just missing half the picture,
it is more like trying to solve a puzzle without all of the pieces.
Understanding the cognitive and emotional correlates of delusions has important
implications for the treatment for individuals with schizophrenia and other disorders
characterized by delusions. Though antipsychotic medication is currently considered a
first-line treatment for symptoms of psychosis, researchers have suggested that cognitive
behavioral therapy (CBT) may be an important treatment component to be used in
conjunction with medication (van der Gaag, 2006). These authors point out that while
antipsychotic medications clearly improve positive symptoms such as delusions,
delusions do not seem to be eliminated by medication alone. One influential theory in this
area suggests that antipsychotic medications, specifically dopamine antagonists, “dampen
the salience” of abnormal experiences, but do not necessarily target other dimensions of
delusional thought that serve to maintain delusional beliefs. In other words, it has been
proposed that antipsychotic medication does not fundamentally change thoughts or ideas;
instead, these ideas lose their significance, thus dimensions such as the preoccupation and
distress associated with the beliefs are diminished, while conviction may remain
relatively unchanged (Kapur, 2003). CBT, on the other hand, has shown promise for
improving (by lowering) conviction in individuals with delusions. Past research has
reported that CBT may be effective at reducing delusional conviction in approximately
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50% of treated cases (Garety et al., 1997; Jakes, Rhodes, & Turner, 1999; Tarrier et al.,
1998).
Work investigating the relationship between psychological processes and
dimensions of delusions has found evidence that cognitive and emotional processes may
both relate to dimensions of delusions. For instance, one study reported that belief
flexibility (a cognitive process) and levels of anxiety (emotion) both contributed to
overall delusion conviction (Garety et al., 2005). While efforts to modify and enhance
CBT to better target the rather unique set of psychological processes contributing to
delusions is already underway, more work is needed in this area. Specifically, more work
aimed at elucidating how the cognitive and emotional correlates of delusional thought
interact is critical in order to clarify the potential pathways to changing these thoughts in
therapy.
Other research has focused on understanding dimensions of delusions because of
potential power for predicting long-term outcome in individuals with schizophrenia. A
recent study reported that poor (compared to good) outcome patients had delusions that
were characterized by greater conviction, extension, disorganization, bizzareness, and
pressure (Opjordsmoen & Retterstol, 2007). Although these authors suggested that
dimensions of delusional thought may have predictive power for long-term outcome, they
cautioned that this finding required replication. While much of the research in this area is
preliminary, two important points have emerged. Taken together, these findings suggest
that it is critical to understand the cognitive and emotional correlates of delusional
thought because of the potential value of dimensions of delusions in predicting treatment
outcome. Secondly, it appears that CBT, which was once not thought of as a viable
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treatment for psychotic disorders, is now being recognized for its potential value in
treating symptoms such as delusions (Zimmermann, Favrod, Trieu, & Pomini, 2005).

Current Aims and Hypotheses
Previous research has established that numerous cognitive and emotional factors
appear to contribute to delusions. The theory that these factors may somehow exert their
impact in combination to form and maintain delusional thought is also gaining
acceptance. Though a handful of recent studies have begun investigating this link, this
line of research appears to be in its infancy. More work is needed which aims to clarify
the nature of the relationship among cognitive processes, emotions, and delusions.
The current study sought to investigate how emotional content influences
cognitive biases that have previously been shown to be present in individuals with
delusions. Three tasks assessing reasoning and attention biases were selected based on
the available literature in each respective area. In order to address the influence of
emotion processing on task performance, emotionally salient stimuli were incorporated
into these cognitive tasks, creating two conditions (emotional and neutral) of each task.
This method allowed for task performance to be explored using both raw values of
selected indices of performance (e.g., reaction time in the emotional Stroop task) and an
additional measure of the ‘emotion effect.’ This term refers to the discrepancy between
performance in the emotional and neutral condition in matched set of tasks. Though each
task possessed a different metric of general performance, for instance, total number of
words recalled on the word recall task versus number of trials to decision on the jumping
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to conclusions task, the emotion effect consistently refers to the difference between the
emotional and neutral conditions of each respective set of tasks.
While there are various methods of investigating the influence of emotion on
cognitive performance, including measuring pre-existing emotional state, or by inducing
mood states unrelated to task stimuli, the current study manipulated the emotional
salience of the actual task itself. It was thought that this approach would most accurately
address the main research question of interest, that is, how are cognitive reasoning and
attention processes influenced by the concurrent processing of emotional salience specific
to the task or problem at hand, and does this relationship differ in individuals with
delusions? In order to address the latter portion of that question, two groups were be
investigated – individuals with a current diagnosis of schizophrenia and community
controls.
In reviewing the literature on delusions and psychosis, it is apparent that delusions
are most commonly studied among individuals with schizophrenia. Much of the past
work investigating the psychological factors of delusions have lumped individuals with
delusions together with those who do not have delusions. This method could potentially
mask differences that exist between the two groups. While the traditional technique of
administering a battery of neurocognitive tasks to a heterogeneous group of individuals
with schizophrenia has contributed greatly to our understanding of the disorder
(Heinrichs, 2005), there are some drawbacks to using this technique to address certain
questions. One potential problem is that the heterogeneity of symptoms commonly
observed in schizophrenia samples may introduce unintended variance when analyzing
performance on cognitive and/or emotional processing tasks. Some authors have
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suggested that future research investigating the cognitive and emotional interactions
underlying single symptoms of the disorder is needed in order to achieve a deeper
understanding of schizophrenia (Aleman & David, 2006). To that end, the current study
administered a multidimensional measure of delusional thought in order to account for
dimensionality of delusion-proneness in our analysis of the data.
By administering an emotional and neutral version of each task, in addition to the
multidimensional delusion measure, two indices of task performance could be compared
among the two groups as well as across the continuum of delusion-proneness. Consistent
with an overall cognitive deficit as suggested in the literature, it was hypothesized that
individuals with schizophrenia would perform more poorly on both the emotional and
neutral versions of these tasks, as compared to performance of controls. It was further
hypothesized that within each group, there would be a statistically significant emotion
effect, indicated by a difference in performance on the emotional (compared to neutral)
version of each task. In addition, it was hypothesized that this predicted emotion effect
would be larger in the schizophrenia group compared to the control group. Finally, it was
hypothesized that the emotion effect would increase as the severity of delusional
proneness increased for all participants, regardless of group.
In addition to these hypotheses, exploratory analyses were also conducted in order
to examine the effects of other task components not directly addressed in our primary
hypotheses. Tasks were analyzed with respect to stimulus valence (positive or negative)
to examine whether participant’s performance was differentially affected by emotion
type. Additional analyses were also conducted in order to examine the effect of the
dimensions of delusion preoccupation, conviction, and distress on performance.
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METHODS

Participants
Power Analysis
In order to obtain an estimate of optimal sample size, a power analysis was
conducted prior to data collection. A small number of previous studies investigating
reasoning biases in deluded individuals with schizophrenia compared to non-psychiatric
controls using the same JTC task variants as the proposed study were identified (Dudley,
John, Young, & Over, 1997a; Dudley et al., 1997b; Menon et al., 2006). Effect sizes
reported in these studies ranged between small (Cohen’s d = 0.34) and large (Cohen’s d =
1.43), based on Cohen’s guidelines (J. Cohen, 1988). The average combined effect size
from these studies (Cohen’s d = 0.88) falls in the large range. Few studies have
investigated emotional Stroop performance specifically in individuals with delusions
compared to controls. In one study that administered an emotional Stroop task (including
neutral, positive, and negative words) to schizophrenia patients with persecutory
delusions and healthy controls, a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.72) was calculated
using Stroop interference scores (time to complete emotional word trials minus time to
complete neutral trials; Kinderman, 1994). Finally, in a previous study investigating
attentional bias using a word recall task in individuals with delusions (persecutory)
compared to healthy controls (Bentall et al., 1995), the effect size for the difference
between recall of emotion (threat or depression-related) and non-emotional words was
calculated and fell in the large range (Cohen’s d = 0.88). An overall effect size was then
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obtained by averaging the three effect sizes from previous studies investigating reasoning
and attentional bias using emotional and neutral task conditions in individuals with
delusions compared to healthy controls (Cohen’s d = 0.83).
Based on the above studies and Cohen’s (1992) recommendations, a power
analysis was conducted using G*Power 3 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007), with an alpha of .05 (two-tailed), and an estimated effect size of 0.83, in order to
estimate the sample size needed to achieve a power level of .80. This procedure yielded
an estimated total sample size (both groups combined) of 48. Based on this estimation, 25
individuals with schizophrenia and 25 control participants were recruited in order to
allow for sufficient power to determine group differences and examine relationships
between performance on emotional versus neutral cognitive task conditions in each
group.

Recruitment
Participants for this study included 25 individuals (outpatients) with
schizophrenia and 25 demographically-matched control participants without a diagnosis
of schizophrenia. Individuals with schizophrenia were recruited from area mental health
facilities, psychiatric units at local hospitals, psychiatrists in private practice, and through
newspaper advertisements. Flyers were also posted in local area establishments (e.g.,
grocery stores). Demographically-matched control participants were recruited from the
local community using flyers, newspaper advertisements, and online advertisements. All
materials used to recruit participants for this study included a statement that participants
completing the study would be monetarily compensated.

40

Initial Exclusionary Criteria
The age range of participants for this study was restricted to adults between the
ages of 18 and 60. The upper age cutoff was set at age 60 in an attempt to avoid potential
confounds due to age-related declines in cognitive performance seen in the general
population (Keefover, 1998). Additional demographic factors that were considered
during recruitment included gender, race, and education level, due to the need to recruit
control participants who were demographically well matched to the schizophrenia group.
A brief phone screen was conducted to determine eligibility (see Procedures below).

Demographic Characteristics
The schizophrenia and control groups were well matched on most demographic
variables (see Table 1). There was no difference in the gender composition between the
groups, as each group consisted of 16 male and 9 female participants (χ2 (1) = 0, p >
0.99). The mean age of participants was 39.61 (SD = 11.92) in the schizophrenia group
and 39.57 (SD = 11.13) in the control group. There were no statistically significant
differences between the groups with respect to age (F (48) = 0.0002, p = 0.99), or race (χ2
(3) = 1.33, p = 0.86). Individuals in the schizophrenia group endorsed membership in the
following racial categories: Caucasian (n = 14), African-American (n = 7), Hispanic (n =
1), Asian (n = 1), and Mixed/Biracial (n = 2); individuals in the control group endorsed:
Caucasian (n = 14), African-American (n = 7), Hispanic (n = 2), and Mixed/Biracial (n =
2).
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There was no statistically significant difference in estimated premorbid
intelligence (t (48) = 1.41, p = 0.17) between the schizophrenia (M = 97.92, SD = 10.30)
and control (M = 101.84, SD = 9.42) groups. The two groups differed, however, on years
of education. Participants in the control group had significantly more years of education
(M = 14.20, SD = 1.89) compared to the schizophrenia sample (M = 12.16, SD = 1.77; t
(48) = 3.93, p < .001). Given that it is common for individuals with schizophrenia to
achieve lower than expected educational attainment, parental educational level was also
examined. There was no statistically significant difference between the groups on this
measure (Hotelling’s T2 = 0.19, F (2, 37) = 0.09, p = 0.92).

Procedures
Phone Screen
Individuals responding to advertisements, flyers, and referrals from mental health
professionals to participate in the study participated in a brief phone screening in order to
assess eligibility for participation. Prior to answering any questions, all participants
provided verbal consent to participate in the phone screen, with the understanding that
they were free to discontinue participation at any point. Participants were then asked to
provide basic demographic information including age, race, gender. Next, participants
were read a list of past experiences, diagnoses, and other health factors that would
prevent them from participating in the study. In order to protect their confidentiality, they
were only required to answer “yes” or “no” after a series of statements, rather than
indicate exactly which statement applied to them. Individuals in both the schizophrenia
and control groups were excluded if they indicated that they: had undergone
electroconvulsive therapy in the past 6 months; met diagnostic criteria for alcohol or
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substance abuse in past month according to the DSM-IV-TR, or met criteria for DSM-IVTR alcohol or substance dependence not in remission for the past 6 months; had a history
of hospitalization for substance dependence (e.g., detox); experienced significant vision
problems; had significant hearing problems; experienced significant problems with the
use of their dominant arm; did not speak English as their first language; had a history of
significant head injury; had a history of neurological illness (including stroke, seizures,
brain tumor, and Parkinson’s disease); or had a history of certain systematic medical
diseases that may affect neurocognitive function (including AIDS, lupus, congestive heart
disease, insulin-dependent diabetes). Individuals who did not fall between the ages of 18
and 60 were not eligible to participate. Additionally, control participants were excluded if
they reported any first-degree relatives with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or a
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Finally, individuals with schizophrenia who were not
undergoing current treatment with antipsychotic medication were excluded. This was
done in an effort to reduce the influence of untreated illness related symptoms (e.g.
hallucinations), particularly on cognitive performance.

Laboratory Procedures
Individuals who completed the laboratory-based portion of the study participated
in a psychological interview, completed self-report measures, and underwent a series of
cognitive tests, all of which were administered or directly supervised by a graduate
student in clinical psychology. All participants completed informed consent procedures
prior to engaging in any of the above mentioned tasks. Visual acuity was then measured
using a standard Snellen wall chart. No participant demonstrated visual acuity less than
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20/50; therefore no participant was excluded from the study based on inadequate visual
acuity. All participants were administered and found to score in the normal range or
above on Ishihara’s test for color blindness. Participants completed a brief measure
assessing premorbid intellectual functioning, and all participants met cutoff criteria for
study inclusion on this measure as well (estimated premorbid intelligence > 70).
Participants in both study groups underwent a brief demographic interview
followed by a formal diagnostic interview. In the schizophrenia group, all participants
met diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, and no participant met diagnostic criteria for
current co-morbid substance dependence. Participants in this group were not excluded if
they reported co-morbid mood or anxiety disorders. All participants in this group
reported current treatment with antipsychotic medication, 22 of whom were taking
atypical antipsychotic medication, one of whom was taking typical antipsychotic
medication, and two of whom were taking both typical and atypical antipsychotic
medications. No participant in the schizophrenia group reported taking narcotic pain
medication. Participants in the control group were excluded if they met diagnostic criteria
for substance dependence (current), a psychotic disorder, or a mood disorder with
psychotic features. This resulted in the discontinuation and exclusion of one participant.
No individual in the control group reported current use of antipsychotic medication or
narcotic pain medication. Individuals in either group reporting the use of prescription
antidepressants or anxiolytics were not excluded. All participants were screened to ensure
that no participant had used any psychotropic substance (except for the proper use of
prescription medication) over the 48 hours prior to testing. Following the interview,
individuals with schizophrenia were administered an additional semi-structured clinical
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interview which assessed the presence and severity of positive and negative
schizophrenia symptoms. All participants then completed a self-report measure of
delusional thought. These measures are described in depth below.
The cognitive portion of the study included the administration of three cognitive
tasks, each of which contained two conditions – a non-emotional (neutral) and an
emotional condition. The jumping to conclusions and Stroop tasks were counterbalanced
so that the starting condition was chosen at random to avoid potential confounds due to
practice effects. While it was not possible to counterbalance the starting condition of the
word recall task (the two conditions are intermixed within the same administration
block), the order of emotional and neutral stimuli were randomized for each participant.
The tasks consisted of: a jumping to conclusions (JTC) probabilistic reasoning task, an
emotional Stroop task; and a word list recall task. These tasks are described in detail
below. The cognitive tasks were embedded in a longer battery of tasks as part of a larger
study. The average session lasted between 2.5 and 5 hours. Upon completion, all
participants received payment (at the rate of $8 per half hour), as well as a debriefing
statement.

Measures
Interview and Psychological Assessment
Informed Consent
All participants were required to provide written consent before participating in
the study. Before signatures of both the participant and witness (the individual
administering the study protocol) were obtained, consent was explained verbally and
participants were given the opportunity to read the consent form and ask any questions.
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They were also provided with a copy for their records. These forms, which contained
identifying information, were stored in a secure filing cabinet separate from the study
data, which was coded numerically to protect the identification of the participants.

The Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV
The Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID-I; First, Gibbon,
Spitzer, & Williams, 1997b) is a semi-structured clinical interview used to assess whether
an individual meets diagnostic criteria for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders. This measure
was used to confirm a diagnosis of schizophrenia in the schizophrenia group. It was also
used to assess other Axis I disorders present in participants from both groups.

The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV Axis II Personality Disorders
The Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders
(SCID-II) is a semi-structured clinical interview used to assess whether an individual
meets diagnostic criteria for an Axis II Personality Disorder (First, Gibbon, Spitzer,
Williams, & Benjamin, 1997a). The current study included selected sections from this
measure used to screen for the presence of avoidant, paranoid, and schizotypal
personality disorders. Previous research has suggested that these disorders may be
genetically linked to schizophrenia (Fogelson et al., 2007; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Items on the SCID-II are scored on a 3-point scale (absent/false = 1,
subthreshold = 2, threshold/true = 3). In order to determine the presence of a categorical
diagnosis based on criteria outlined in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000), the number of individual items with a rating of “3” in each
subcategory is summed.
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Structured Clinical Interview for Positive and Negative Symptom Scales
The PANSS (Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1992; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987) is a
30-item rating scale that assesses positive and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. This
measure includes an optional semi-structured interview (Structured Clinical Interview for
Positive and Negative Symptom Scales; SCI-PANSS) developed to be used with the
PANSS. The SCI-PANSS contains four subscales: Positive symptoms, Negative
symptoms, General Psychopathology, and a Composite scale (Kay et al., 1992). Each
symptom or dimension assessed has distinct criteria which is used to rate severity on a
seven-point Likert scale. The interview is typically conducted in three stages that include
a rapport building stage, a formal semi-structured interview, and a subsequent scoring
stage. Each of the 30 items of the SCI-PANSS is rated on a seven point scale with each
point representing increased levels of symptom severity (1 = Absent, 2 = Minimal, 3 =
Mild, 4 = Moderate, 5 = Moderate/Severe, 6 = Severe, 7 = Extreme). Symptoms assessed
by the SCI-PANSS are well defined in the accompanying examiner’s manual and scoring
instructions.
According to reliability assessments of the SCI-PANSS, each individual item
included in the measure correlates strongly with the appropriate scale total (Kay et al.,
1987). Alpha coefficients of single items ranged from .64 to .84, and no gains in alpha
coefficients were made by eliminating SCI-PANSS items. Inter-rater reliability
correlations ranged between .89 and .94 (Kay, Opler, & Lindenmayer, 1988; Von
Knorring & Lindstrom, 1995). Assessments of validity have shown strong discriminate
and convergent validity, criterion validity, predictive validity, and concurrent validity
(Kay et al., 1992). Individuals administering the SCI-PANSS in the current study
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underwent training on this instrument through web-based videos provided by The
PANSS Institute, LLC.

Reading Subtest of the Wide Range Achievement Test – 3rd edition
The Reading Subtest of the Wide Range Achievement Test, Third Edition
(WRAT-3R; Wilkinson, 1993) is a list of 42 words presented in order of increasing
difficulty. In order to reduce instances of phonemic decoding on this task, these words are
irregular with respect to common rules of pronunciation. The WRAT-3R has been
standardized with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd edition (WAIS-III). The
WRAT-3R is scored by obtaining the sum of correctly pronounced words. From this
value, a reading scaled score is obtained. This value corresponds to an estimate of verbal
intelligence. Previous research has supported the use of the WRAT-3 Reading scaled
score as an acceptable estimate of premorbid IQ (in this case, prior to the onset of
schizophrenia), particularly in individuals from the lower range of IQ (Griffin, Mindt,
Rankin, Ritchie, & Scott, 2002; Johnstone, Callahan, Kapila, & Bouman, 1996).

The 40-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory
The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999a), which was
originally based on The Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974),
was designed to measure delusional ideation in a healthy population. Items were chosen
specifically for the purposes of measuring attenuated psychotic symptoms and sampling a
wide range of delusional beliefs (Peters et al., 1999a). The PDI is designed to capture the
dichotomous positive or negative endorsement of each item, but also taps into the
dimensionality of the delusional belief. A respondent initially chooses a “yes/no”
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response to each question, for example, “Do you ever feel as though there is a conspiracy
against you?” If the respondent does endorse the item, he or she is then asked to rate the
degree of distress, preoccupation, and conviction of the delusional thought on a five-point
Likert scale (ranging from 0-5).
The PDI yes/no scores are obtained by adding up the number of “yes” items
(assigned one point) and the number of “no” items (assigned 0 points), yielding a range
of 0 to 40 points. Additionally, each dimension measured on the 5-point Likert scale can
be scored, obtaining a range from 0 to 200 points. The grand total PDI score can be
obtained by adding up the three dimension scores and the yes/no score, for a range from 0
to 640 points.
Scores on the PDI were normally distributed in a healthy population sample (n =
272; Peters et al., 1999a). No differences were found between males and females on
yes/no scores, any of the dimensions, or on the total PDI score. Significant inverse
relationships with age were found on yes/no scores, the distress and preoccupation
subscales, as well as a trend between age and the conviction subscale. The PDI was found
to have good internal consistency (0.88), and good test-retest reliability (0.82) was
demonstrated in a subset of the sample who was asked to retake the measure six months
to a year later. The measure was also found to have good convergent validity, sharing
52% to 58% of common variance with the Delusions-Symptoms-State-Inventory (Foulds
& Bedford, 1975); the Schizotypal Personality Scale (Claridge & Broks, 1984) and the
Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Criterion validity was established
by administering the PDI to a group of currently deluded, psychotic individuals (N = 20).
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Ratings on the total number of items endorsed and on all scales of the PDI were
statistically significantly higher in this group (Peters et al., 1999a).

Cognitive Tasks
Stroop Task
A computerized Stroop task with two conditions - emotional and neutral - was
administered. Participants were seated 18 inches away from a 22-inch CRT monitor
(Iiyama Vision Master Pro 514) and PC computer. A chin/forehead rest was used in order
to minimize head movement and ensure that each participant was within 8” of a
microphone which was used to record the reaction time of the onset of the vocal
response.
Several variations of the emotional Stroop task exist. Emotion and non-emotion
(neutral) words for the current study were selected from the Affective Norms for English
Words (ANEW) word list (Bradley & Lang, 1998). The ANEW word list consists of
several hundred English words that have been rated on dimensions such as emotional
arousal and emotional valence. In order to maximize the potential to detect differences
between conditions, an equal number of high arousal negative and positive words were
used in the emotional condition. The non-emotional condition consisted of an equal
number of neutral words. Words in both conditions were matched on word frequency and
word length. Word matching and selection was achieved using an online program
designed to be used in conjunction with the ANEW list (Siegle, 1994).
Following procedures described by Compton et al., words were presented in two
blocks (one emotional, one neutral), as previous research has demonstrated that
emotional words become harder to ignore when they are grouped together rather than
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intermixed with neutral words (Compton et al., 2003). In order to control for possible
habituation effects within participants, no word was ever repeated. In both conditions,
participants were told to orally state the font color of the words, which appeared in one of
four color choices: red, green, blue, or yellow.
A total of 100 trials were administered, equally divided into 50 trials of each
condition. Though conditions were blocked according to emotional versus non-emotional
words (counterbalanced order by participant), within each condition, words were
presented in a random order that differed for each participant. Therefore, it was possible
that several negative or positive words appeared in succession within the emotion
condition. Stimuli were presented one at a time in uppercase 40-point Arial font in the
center of the computer screen against a black background. Each stimulus was
immediately preceded by a fixation cross in the middle of the screen (lasting 250 ms).
Stimuli were presented for a maximum of 4 sec, or until the participant orally stated his
or her response into a microphone, triggering the word to disappear immediately. The
fixed intertrial interval lasted for 2000 ms and consisted of a blank, black screen.
Before the task began, the following instructions appeared on the computer
monitor and were read out loud to the participant: “Welcome to the color-naming task.
When you see a word appear on the screen, please state the font color of each word
presented as quickly as you can without making mistakes. Remember, you are to state the
color of the font and ignore the word itself.” Participant’s verbal responses were
measured via a voice-activated microphone and recorded by the computer to millisecond
accuracy in order to track reaction time. Responses were manually coded by the
experimenter for accuracy during the intertrial interval. A 10 trial practice session
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(consisting of neutral words) preceded the administration of the actual task in order to
familiarize the participant with the task. During the practice session, participants were
given verbal feedback concerning their performance from the administrator. The total
amount of time needed to complete the task ranged from five to seven minutes.
Reaction time (RT) data from each participant was filtered so that only correct
trials were included in the RT data used in the analyses. This was done in an effort to
exclude trials that may have rewarded participants for answering quickly without regard
for accuracy and penalized participants for taking the time to provide a correct response.
Following this procedure, accuracy scores were reviewed to ensure that any participant
with an accuracy score around chance (< 33%), within either condition, would be
excluded. Examination of accuracy scores revealed that, within each condition, no
participant obtained a score below 64%, therefore no participant was excluded for failing
to adequately attend to or comprehend the task. This filtered RT value served as a general
measure of performance, as indicated by response efficiency in correct trials. The
expected emotion effect in both groups is a longer average RT in the emotional condition
compared to the neutral condition.

Word Recall Task
A word recall task was administered as a measure of attentional bias. In a
previous study investigating attentional bias toward threat-related, depression-related, and
neutral words in three groups (individuals with delusions, individuals with depression,
and controls), participants viewed 36 words printed on small cards (12 from each
respective category), one at a time (Bentall et al., 1995). Words were intermixed and
presented in a random order that differed in each participant. They were then asked to
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remember as many words as possible. Number of words recalled was recorded and
repetitions were noted as well. Attentional bias was determined by comparing the mean
number of words recalled in each condition across groups. If a group recalled a greater
number of words from a given list compared to the recall of other groups, this was
thought to indicate the presence of an attentional bias. In order to determine whether
there were specific recall biases within the individual groups, the mean number of words
recalled from each group of words was compared within participant groups (Bentall et
al., 1995).
A variation of this task was employed in the current study. A total of 18 emotional
words (half positive and half negative) and 18 non-emotional words were presented in a
single presentation format, for a total of 36 words. Words chosen for this task were
generated using the same procedure described above to choose words for the emotional
Stroop task. In order to avoid carry over effects, no word used on the Stroop task was
repeated in the word recall task. Instead of employing a card version of the task, the
current study used a computerized version of the task. Before the task, participants saw
following instructions on the computer screen: “You will see a group of words presented
one at a time on the screen. Please look at each word carefully, because immediately after
all words are presented, you will be asked to remember as many of these words as you
can, in any order.” All 36 words were then presented singly on the screen at a fixed rate
(1000 ms per word) in a random sequence that differed for each participant. Following
each word, a blank screen appeared for 1000 ms before the presentation of the next word.
Words appeared in black ink against a white background in 36-point Arial font in the
center of the screen. Words appeared in lowercase lettering. After all of the words were
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presented, a free recall trial took place. Participants were asked by the experimenter to
state aloud all of the words that they remembered, in any order. Responses were recorded
verbatim by the experimenter. Raw scores indicated how many words a participant
recalled in each condition, which serves as a general measure of sustained attention and
subsequent recall of visually presented verbal information. More words recalled in one
condition compared to another suggests an attentional bias. The expected emotion effect
in both groups is for more emotion words to be recalled as compared to neutral words.
This task took approximately 5 minutes to complete.

Jumping to Conclusions Probabilistic Reasoning Task
Different variations of the jumping to conclusions task (JTC) exist, most of
which are based on the Bayesian model of reasoning (Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold,
2007). This model describes reasoning as rooted in one’s degree of belief based on
probability as determined by the available empirical evidence (Oaksford & Chater, 2003).
The original and most commonly used version of the task is the ‘beads in a jar’ paradigm,
described by Huq and colleagues (1988) in their study with deluded schizophrenia
patients. This task requires individuals to decide which jar of colored beads a series of
individual beads (which appear to be drawn in random sequence) is being drawn from.
Participants are usually presented with two jars with opposite ratios (most commonly
85:15 and 15:85) of colored beads. The jars are then hidden and an experimenter ‘draws’
a pre-selected series of beads one at a time. Some variations of the task require the
participant to state which jar is being drawn from when they are sure that they have the
correct answer (‘draws to decision’ methodology), while others present all participants
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with the same series of beads and ask that they rate their degree of certainty that the
beads come from a particular jar (‘draws to certainty’ method).
A ‘realistic’ version of the beads task was developed by Dudley and colleagues.
Instead of using beads in a jar, these authors read aloud unambiguous male and female
names to participants, who were told that the names originated from a list of students
from either a mostly girls (60 girls and 40 boys) or mostly boys (60 boys and 40 girls)
school. When participants were confident they knew which list names were being read
from, they were instructed to state their answer aloud. In order to increase task demands,
these authors also altered the 85:15 ratio typically used in the beads task to a 60:40 ratio
(Dudley et al., 1997b). In a separate study, these authors describe an emotional
counterpart version of the neutral names task. In this task, participants are read aloud
personality attributes (either negative or positive) and told that these traits originate from
a hypothetical survey conducted about an unknown individual. On the ‘mostly good’
survey, 60 people made positive comments and 40 people made negative comments; on
the ‘mostly bad’ survey, the ratio is reversed. Participants are asked to decide which
survey the personality attributes originate from when they believe they know the correct
answer (Dudley et al., 1997a).
While the beads task and the ‘realistic’ names task are both considered neutral
versions of the JTC reasoning bias, the names task was chosen for the current study. This
was done in an effort to ensure that the emotional and non-emotional versions of each
task were as similar as possible. Following the procedures described by Menon et al.,
three trials of each JTC task were administered. These authors used a random number
generator in order to determine the sequence of names and personality attributes (Menon
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et al., 2006). The current study used the same sequences described by these authors, using
identical sequences across both conditions. The order of the emotional and neutral
conditions was counterbalanced by participant.
In a recent meta-analysis investigating different methods for measuring the JTC
reasoning bias, it was reported that a tendency to gather less evidence (measured by the
‘draws to decision’ method) was reliably associated with delusional symptomatology,
while other indices of performance investigated did not discriminate well between
individuals with and without delusions (Fine et al., 2007). According to this method, the
fewer draws to decision (beads task), or pieces of information (realistic task) requested,
the greater the JTC bias. Therefore, the current study used draws to decision as the
primary measure of the JTC bias. As there were three trials in each condition, a total
score for was obtained by averaging performance across trials, yielding two outcome
scores for each participant (JTC neutral task mean score and JTC emotional task mean
score). While these scores represented overall proficiency on the task, the emotion effect
referred to the difference in performance between the two conditions. This task lasted
between 5 and 10 minutes.
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RESULTS

Measures of Symptom Severity
In terms of general illness characteristics, participants in the schizophrenia group
reported an average illness duration of 16.17 years (SD = 11.25) and an average age of
illness onset of 24.20 years (SD = 11.00). Individuals in the schizophrenia group were
rated on symptom severity using the SCI-PANSS. The SCI-PANSS Positive Symptom
Scale mean was 20.36 (SD = 5.20), the Negative Symptom Scale mean was 18.08 (SD =
4.23), the General Psychopathology Scale mean was 37.08 (SD = 6.91), and the mean
Composite score was 2.28 (SD = 6.76). On the individual SCI-PANSS item assessing
delusion severity, the group mean was 4.04 (SD = 1.24), which indicated symptom
severity in the moderate range. Examination of the raw scores among individual
participants in the schizophrenia group revealed that all but two attained a score of at
least 3 (mild range) on this item, indicating that almost all of the 25 schizophrenia
participants endorsed the presence of delusional thought (within the past 6 months)
beyond the absent/minimal ranges.
Individuals in both the control and schizophrenia group completed a multidimensional measure of delusion-proneness (PDI). The scores were as follows for the
schizophrenia group: mean PDI Total score of 185.48 (SD = 113.77), PDI Yes/No score
= 15.64 (SD = 8.79), PDI Distress score = 52.72 (SD = 33.75), PDI Preoccupation score
= 52.84 (SD = 33.24), and PDI Conviction score = 64.28 (SD = 41.16). In the control
group, the scores were: PDI Total score = 52.64 (SD = 48.64), PDI Yes/No score = 5.84
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(SD = 4.62), PDI Distress score = 11.64 (SD = 13.29), PDI Preoccupation score = 15.52
(SD = 15.14), and PDI Conviction score = 19.64 (SD = 17.54). See Table 1.
PDI scores were examined between groups to determine whether the two groups
self-reported different levels of symptomatology on this measure. It was expected that
individuals in the schizophrenia group would report higher PDI scores on all indices.
According to Levene's Test for equality of variances, guidelines for homogeneity of
variance (p > 0.05) between the two groups were not met for any of the PDI indices.
Therefore, a Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to examine between group differences on the
PDI. This test revealed that the schizophrenia group scored statistically significantly
higher on all PDI indices, including: PDI Total score (χ² (1) = 18.64, p < .001), PDI
Yes/No score (χ² (1) = 16.49, p < .001), PDI Distress score (χ² (1) = 21.37, p < .001), PDI
Preoccupation score (χ² (1) = 17.58, p < .001), and PDI Conviction score (χ² (1) = 17.98,
p < .001). In the schizophrenia group, PDI Total scores ranged from 6 to 434 (M =
185.48, SD = 113.77), whereas in the control group PDI Total scores ranged from 0 to
186 (M = 52.64, SD = 48.64). See Table 1.
Next, correlations were conducted in order to explore the relationships between
selected measures of clinical symptoms in the schizophrenia group (control participants
could not be included in this analysis due to the absence of SCI-PANSS scores). Since
the PDI total score includes all other PDI subscales scores, this score was chosen for the
purpose of exploring the relationship between self-reported delusional thought and all
primary SCI-PANSS scores as well as the individual delusions item from the SCIPANSS. Examination of indices of normality revealed skewness and kurtosis values
within acceptable ranges for all variables. A Bonferroni correction was applied to an
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alpha value of 0.05 to control for multiple comparisons (0.05/5 = 0.01). Results revealed
a statistically significant relationship between the PDI total score and the SCI-PANSS
Positive symptom score (r = 0.72, p < 0.001), PANSS Composite score (r = 0.69, p <
0.001) and SCI-PANSS delusion score (r = 0.58, p = 0.002). The relationship between
the PDI total score and the SCI-PANSS General score showed a statistical trend that did
not meet criteria for significance given the conservative correction applied (r = 0.44, p =
0.03). These results indicate good reliability between the self-report measure of delusion
propensity and observer ratings of positive symptoms (including delusions) in this
sample. The SCI-PANSS Negative symptom score was not statistically significantly
related to the PDI total score (r = -0.21, p = 0.31). This was expected, given that negative
symptoms of schizophrenia include those generally thought to be unrelated to delusional
thought (e.g., blunted affect, stereotyped thinking).

Cognitive Tasks
Primary Hypotheses
In order to test the primary set of hypotheses exploring potential relationships
among group, task performance, and delusion-propensity (as measured by the PDI total
score), statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 16.0 software. All data sets were
complete for all participants (n = 50), so problems with missing data were not applicable.
Since PDI total scores were used in all analyses of the main hypotheses, skewness and
kurtosis values were examined in both groups (n = 25); none exceeded recommended
guidelines (greater than +/- 2; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Indices of normality specific
to each task are reported below.
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Stroop Task Performance
To test the primary hypotheses within this task, a mixed ANCOVA and a series of
paired-samples t tests were performed. In the mixed ANCOVA, one independent variable
(IV) was group (schizophrenia or control), the second IV was task condition (emotional
or neutral), the PDI total score was entered as a covariate, and the dependent variable
(DV) was reaction time. Indicators of normality were examined to determine if
recommended assumptions for this statistical test were met. An examination of skewness
and kurtosis in each of the two groups revealed values that fell within recommended
guidelines of +/- 2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Box’s M Test for equality was
significant (p = 0.009) indicating that the assumption of equal covariance values among
the two levels of the dependent variable across groups was not met. According to
Levene’s Test for equality of variances, the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p >
0.05) in the groups was met. Given that most indices of normality fell within
recommended guidelines, data was not transformed prior to analysis.
It was hypothesized that individuals with schizophrenia would respond more
slowly (e.g., longer RT) on both the emotional and neutral versions of the Stroop task
compared to the performance of controls on these tasks. In order to address this question,
the main effect of group (collapsing the two conditions) was examined, which revealed a
statistical trend for significance in the predicted direction (F (1, 46) = 2.91, p = 0.10, η2 =
0.06). In order to address the next hypothesis, paired samples t-tests were conducted. It
was hypothesized that, within each group, there would be a statistically significant
emotional effect between task conditions, indicated by a difference in performance on the
emotion (compared to neutral) task condition. This hypothesis was partially supported, as
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results revealed that within the schizophrenia group, participants demonstrated a
statistically significant increase in reaction time on the emotional condition (t (24) = 2.19,
p = 0.04), while controls showed no reaction time difference between the two conditions
(t (24) = 1.10, p = 0.28; see Figure 1). The next hypothesis was addressed by examining
the condition by group interaction from the mixed ANCOVA in order to determine
whether the predicted emotion effect would be larger in the schizophrenia group. This
hypothesis was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.01, p = 0.93, η2 < 0.01). In order to
investigate the fourth hypothesis that the emotion effect would increase as the severity of
delusional proneness increased for all participants (regardless of group), the condition by
PDI total score interaction term was examined. Results did not support this hypothesis (F
(1, 46) = 2.12, p = 0.15, η2 = 0.04). See Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Word Recall Task
The above described analyses were then repeated in order to investigate our
primary hypotheses with the word recall task. An examination of indices of normality,
including skewness and kurtosis values, Box’s M Test for equality of covariance among
dependent variables, and Levene’s Test for equality of variances indicated that all values
were within acceptable ranges. A mixed ANCOVA with group at the first IV, task
condition as the second IV, number of words recalled as the DV, and PDI total score as a
covariate was conducted. The hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia would recall
fewer words on both the emotional and neutral conditions compared to controls was
supported (F (1, 46) = 7.28, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.14). Paired-samples t tests were conducted to
determine whether there was a statistically significant emotion effect (indicated by recall
of fewer neutral compared to emotion words) in either group. Results revealed no
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difference in the schizophrenia (t (24) = 0.00, p = 1.00) or control groups (t (24) = -0.55,
p = 0.59). Results of the mixed ANCOVA did not indicate support for the hypothesis that
there would be a larger emotion effect in the schizophrenia group compared to the control
group (F (1, 46) = 0.98, p = 0.33, η2 = 0.02). Next, the hypothesis that the emotion effect
would increase as the severity of delusional proneness increased for all participants
(regardless of group) was addressed. The condition by PDI total score interaction from
the mixed ANCOVA revealed that this hypothesis was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.95, p
= 0.33, η2 = 0.02). See Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Jumping to Conclusions Probabilistic Reasoning Task
Finally, the same set of analyses was repeated with the data from the JTC task. In
the mixed ANCOVA, group was the first IV, task condition was the repeated measures
IV, number of draws to conclusion served at the DV, and PDI total score was the
covariate. An examination of skewness and kurtosis statistics indicated values within
acceptable ranges for all DV’s. However, values from Box’s M Test for equality of
covariance among dependent variables (p = 0.01) and Levene’s Test for homogeneity of
variance between groups were statistically significant (JTC neutral: p = 0.02; JTC
emotional: p = 0.003). Data (DV scores) were then transformed using a square root
transformation, after which all indices of normality fell within acceptable ranges.
The hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia would require fewer draws to
reach a conclusion on both the emotional and non-emotional versions of the JTC task
compared to controls was supported (F (1, 46) = 4.82, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.10). Paired
samples t-tests, which were conducted to determine whether there was a statistically
significant emotion effect within each individual group, revealed no emotion effect in
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either the schizophrenia (t (24) = 0.99, p = 0.33) or control (t (24) = 0.63, p = 0.53)
group. Examination of the condition by group interaction effect from the ANCOVA
revealed that the third hypothesis (emotion effect would be larger in the schizophrenia
group) was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.34, p = 0.86, η2 = 0.001). The fourth hypothesis
was that the emotion effect would increase as the severity of delusional proneness
increased for all participants. The condition by PDI total score interaction effect revealed
that this hypothesis was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.62, p = 0.43, η2 = 0.01). See Tables
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Exploratory Analyses
Cognitive Tasks: Valence
In addition to the primary hypotheses discussed, exploratory analyses were
conducted in order to examine relationships among secondary features of the measures,
including valence of emotional stimuli (positive or negative), which could be analyzed
separately in both the Stroop and word recall tasks. Stroop data was analyzed first using a
mixed ANCOVA. An examination of skewness and kurtosis within the groups revealed
values exceeding recommended cutoffs (greater than +/- 2) for skewness in negative RT:
control group, and kurtosis in negative RT: control group, positive RT: control group, and
positive RT: schizophrenia group. Box’s M test for equality was significant (p = 0.008),
indicating that the assumption of equal covariance values between levels of the dependent
variable was violated. Levene’s Test for homogeneity of variance between groups was
not statistically significant. For the purposes of these exploratory analyses, the ANCOVA
was performed with the caveat that not all recommended assumptions of normality were
satisfied. In the mixed ANCOVA, group served as an IV, valence (positive or negative)
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was the second IV, RT was the DV, and PDI total score was entered as a covariate. An
examination of main effects revealed that the effect of valence was statistically
significant (F (1, 46) = 7.88, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.15), indicating that overall performance on
this task was impacted by valence. Both groups performed better, that is they evidenced
lower RT’s, for positive words. However, the valence by group interaction was not
statistically significant (F (1, 46) = 1.83, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.04), nor was the valence by PDI
total score interaction (F (1, 46) = 0.28, p = 0.64, η2 = 0.01), suggesting that the groups
did not perform differently as a function of valence, and the effect of valence was not
related to level of delusion-proneness. See Table 2 and 7.
Exploratory analyses were conducted to examine potential relationships among
task valence, group, and PDI total score in the word recall task. An examination of
skewness and kurtosis in each of the two groups revealed values that fell within
recommended guidelines of +/- 2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), with the exception of the
positive words variable in the schizophrenia group (kurtosis value = 2.98). Box’s M Test
for equality was not significant, nor were the values from Levene’s Test for equality of
homogeneity of variance in the groups. Because there was only one relatively minor
violation of normality detected, a mixed ANCOVA was performed with group as one IV,
valence as the second IV, number of words recalled as the DV, and PDI as the covariate.
An examination of main effects revealed that the effect of valence was not statistically
significant (F (1, 46) = 1.07, p = 0.31, η2 = 0.02). The valence by group interaction was
not statistically significant (F (1, 46) = 0.20, p = 0.90, η2 < 0.01), nor was the valence by
PDI total score interaction (F (1, 46) = 1.01, p = 0.32, η2 = 0.02). See Table 2 and 8.
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PDI Dimension Scores
In order to determine whether any particular subscale(s) of the PDI was more
sensitive to differences in performance on the three sets of cognitive tasks, exploratory
analyses were conducted. A series of mixed ANCOVAs were performed, and in all of
these analyses, one IV was group, a second IV was condition (emotional or neutral), and
the DV was the measure of performance in the task being examined in that analysis (i.e.,
emotional Stroop RT, words recalled, or draws to conclusion in the JTC task). Three
analyses were conducted for each task, one with each of the PDI subscales (distress,
preoccupation, or conviction) serving as the covariate. The condition by PDI subscale
interaction and the group by condition by PDI subscale interaction were examined in
each analysis to determine whether task performance differed as a function of these
individual subscales, which were grouped together in the main analyses. None of these
interactions of interest were statistically significant; see Tables 9, 10, and 11.
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DISCUSSION

The aim of the study was to investigate the influence of emotional content on
cognitive processing in individuals with schizophrenia and demographically matched
healthy controls. Previous research has established that specific cognitive deficits related
to reasoning and attention processes are often observed in individuals with delusions
(e.g., Bell et al., 2006), a symptom present in a majority of individuals with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia. Therefore, three tasks thought to capture various types of cognitive biases
in these cognitive domains were chosen for inclusion in the current study: an emotional
Stroop task (selective attention to emotionally salient stimuli), a word recall task
(preferential recall of emotional stimuli), and a jumping to conclusions task (a bias
toward hasty decision making in probabilistic reasoning). In order to investigate the
influence of concurrent processing of emotion during performance on the cognitive tasks
described above, an emotional and neutral version of each task was administered. As
subclinical delusional thought also appears to be present in individuals without a clinical
diagnosis of a psychotic disorder (Verdoux & van Os, 2002), delusion-proneness was
measured in both groups of participants in the current study. Data was subsequently
analyzed in order to investigate group differences in cognitive performance, as well as
any emotion effect (a discrepancy between emotional and neutral conditions in each set
of tasks) that may have been present in the groups. The relationship between delusionproneness and the emotion effect was also investigated. Finally, exploratory analyses
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were conducted to examine the effect of other task characteristics on performance,
including task valence and dimensions of delusion-proneness.
Based on previous literature describing cognitive deficits in schizophrenia,
specifically in relation to delusions (e.g., Rocca et al., 2006), it was hypothesized that
individuals in the schizophrenia group would perform more poorly on all cognitive tasks
compared to the performance of the control group. The analyses of this hypothesis
therefore combined performance on the emotional and neutral versions of each respective
task. This hypothesis was generally supported across all tasks, though results from the
emotional Stroop task revealed a statistical trend for significance in the predicted
direction (small effect size), while results from the other two tasks revealed statistically
significant (alpha levels < 0.05) findings and effect sizes in the medium range. With this
caveat in mind, results indicated that individuals in the schizophrenia group performed
more poorly on the cognitive tasks compared to individuals in the control group. In the
emotional Stroop task, this was indicated by a trend for the schizophrenia group to
demonstrate longer response times to both emotional and neutral stimuli combined. In the
word recall task, poorer overall performance was indicated by the tendency of individuals
in the schizophrenia group to recall fewer words in both conditions combined. On the
JTC task, individuals with schizophrenia requested less information before reaching a
conclusion, again on both task conditions combined, as compared to controls. This
pattern of results was not surprising given the ample evidence that individuals with
schizophrenia typically display a variety of cognitive deficits, as well as the fact that
tasks in this study were specifically chosen based on the research literature on individuals
with delusions. Overall, results indicated that the two groups in this study performed as
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expected on the cognitive tasks with respect to previous findings described in the
research literature.
The second hypothesis specifically tested for the presence of an emotion effect
within each group separately for each set of tasks. Results of data analyses for the word
recall task and the JTC task revealed nonsignificant findings, indicating that an emotion
effect was not detected for these tasks in either group. On the emotional Stroop task, an
emotion effect was observed in the schizophrenia group. Specifically, individuals in this
group performed statistically significantly worse in the emotional version of the task, as
indicated by increased RT for emotion words compared to neutral words. However, no
emotion effect was observed in the control group on the emotional Stroop task. Overall,
these results were somewhat unexpected. It was anticipated that both groups would show
an emotion effect in all three sets of tasks. This hypothesis was based on previous
research indicating that the presence of emotional content in the specific cognitive tasks
employed typically results in performance deficits in healthy controls and a variety of
clinical groups, including those with delusions. In the control group of this study, the
emotion effect was not observed on any of the tasks, and in the schizophrenia group it
was only observed in the emotional Stroop task. One point that was considered in
interpreting these findings is that previous investigations of the emotion effect in the
word recall and JTC task are fewer in number compared to the emotional Stroop task,
which is much more widely studied and standardized. Nevertheless, previous reports
have demonstrated instances in which the performance of both healthy controls and
individuals with delusions are affected by emotional content in the emotional Stroop
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(Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Williams et al., 1996), word recall (Mathews & Barch, 2004;
Bentall et al., 1995) and JTC tasks (Dudley et al., 1997b).
The hypothesis that the emotion effect would be larger in the schizophrenia group
as compared to the control group was also not supported. The interactions of group by
emotion condition from all three tasks were not statistically significant, and an inspection
of effect sizes revealed no hint of an effect (η2 values ranges from 0.00 to 0.02) in any of
the tasks. While it appears that very few previous studies have investigated this specific
question using these tasks, several theoretical explanations for delusions predict that
individuals with delusions will have more difficulty processing emotionally salient
material during cognitive performance compared to controls (e.g., Freeman & Garety,
2003). Therefore, these results were somewhat unexpected, though less so when
considered in the context of the other findings and after accounting for the potential
influence of task constraints.
Several factors are relevant to understanding the apparent lack of a difference in
the magnitude of an emotion effect between the groups. The most salient of these factors
is that an emotion effect was not observed in either of the groups, with the exception of
the emotional Stroop task, for which the effect was only present in the schizophrenia
group. Given that the emotion manipulation generally did not produce the expected
effects on performance, the absence of a larger emotion effect in the schizophrenia group
made sense, especially for the JTC and word recall task. In order to better explain these
findings, each task will be considered individually to account for task specific
characteristics of potential relevance.
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Examination of results of the word recall task revealed that, not only did the
schizophrenia group fail to demonstrate an emotion effect, this group had identical mean
scores on the emotional and neutral conditions (2.72 words). The control group showed a
similar pattern of performance, though qualitatively, there was a very small difference in
mean scores between conditions that was not statistically significant. This finding was
partially consistent with a previous study of attentional biases in a word recall task in
individuals with persecutory delusions, individuals with depression, and healthy controls
(Bentall et al., 1995). These authors reported that the delusion group showed a bias
toward recall of threat-related and depression-related words, while controls did not. The
current study did not detect a bias in either group, however important differences in
group composition and task design may partially account for these seemingly discrepant
findings. Bentall et al. (1995) limited their delusion group to those with persecutory
delusions, while the current study included individuals with other subtypes of delusions.
Furthermore, in the Bentall et al. study, emotion words were limited to those that were
thought to be personally relevant (i.e., threat-related) to the persecutory group (depression
words were included for the depression group), while the current study included general
emotion words equally mixed between positive and negative valence and matched for
intensity. This was done to account for the inclusion of a mixed delusion group, and to
ensure that the emotion task was also relevant to controls.
While Bentall et al. (1995) found no recall bias in their control group, other
studies have reported an effect of emotional words in similar recall tasks with a healthy
control group using general positive and negative emotion words (e.g., Mathews &
Barch, 2004). These authors sought to compare the performance of healthy controls to
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that of schizophrenia patients with the hypothesis that patients with specific negative
symptoms would fail to show an emotion effect. These authors found that both the
control group and the schizophrenia group showed an emotion effect, and that this effect
was not larger in one group or the other. Interestingly, the severity of blunted affect in
patients was associated with a smaller emotion effect in this study, while positive
symptoms of schizophrenia were unrelated to the magnitude of the emotion effect
(Mathews & Barch, 2004). Similarly, the current study also failed to find a relationship
between delusions (a positive symptom) and the magnitude of emotion effect in the word
recall task. It should be noted that the recall task employed by Mathews and Barch (2004)
was an incidental-encoding task which required participants to evaluate words for
valence and intensity immediately followed by a surprise free recall trial. In contrast, the
task used in the current study was a passive task that merely exposed participants to each
word very briefly, followed by a free recall trial. This was done in an effort to reduce the
influence of task complexity and/or the use of memory strategies in healthy controls on
recall performance. However, it is possible that the effortful processing component of the
task used by Mathews and Barch was a more effective means for investigating the effect
of concurrent emotion processing during a traditional cognitive task. Overall, it is
possible that using a task that 1) included words that were more salient to individuals
with delusions and 2) using a task with a more active encoding component may have
resulted in an emotion effect in the current study.
Previous studies of attention bias have suggested that valence may influence the
degree of bias to particular emotion words (Strauss & Allen, 2009), so this factor was
examined in the current study. Within the word recall task, an analysis of valence effects

71

indicated that participants in both groups performed similarly, regardless of whether
emotion words were positive or negative, and valence was not related to level of
delusion-proneness. Therefore, it is unlikely that combining positive and negative words
in the emotion condition had an appreciable influence on the results of the word recall
analyses.
Examination of the lack of an emotion effect in the JTC task both within and
between the groups revealed several possible factors that may have contributed to this
finding. One factor of interest was task type. While the majority of previous research has
utilized the traditional ‘beads’ version of the task, the current study employed the less
frequently used ‘names’ version as the neutral condition. This task was designed to be
used in comparative studies of the emotionally salient JTC bias as it serves as a more
realistic neutral comparison task than the beads task (Dudley et al., 1997a). In the first
study using the names task, it was reported that individuals with delusions required less
evidence before coming to a conclusion compared to healthy controls, which was noted
to be consistent with previous findings from the beads task (Dudley et al., 1997a). These
authors also reported that mean JTC scores for the beads and names versions of the
neutral task were similar in their sample (Dudley et al., 1997b). Thus, there is support for
the notion that the names task is comparable with the beads task. Nevertheless, given that
the majority of prior research that influenced the hypotheses concerning JTC
performance in the current study employed the beads task, the use of the names task
cannot be ruled out as a possible factor contributing to the results of the current study.
The emotional JTC task used in the current study was based on the ‘survey’ task
described by Dudley et al. (1997a), however, while these authors reported an emotion
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effect in both the delusion and control groups when contrasting the neutral names task
with the emotional survey task, the current study failed to find such an effect. These
authors did not include an analysis of the comparison of the size of the emotion effect
between groups in this article. However this information was available in a recent review
article (Fine et al., 2007) and these authors reported that there was no difference between
the size of the emotion effects in the psychiatric versus nonpsychiatric groups in the
Dudley et al. (1997a) study, which is consistent with findings from the current study. In a
study conducted by Warman and colleagues (2007) using the emotional JTC task, it was
reported that individuals with delusions gathered significantly less information than
control participants in both the neutral and emotional tasks. However, unlike Dudley et
al. (1997a), these authors did not detect the presence of a statistically significant emotion
effect in either group. While our findings regarding the lack of an emotion effect in the
JTC task are therefore consistent with that of Warman et al. (2007), it should be noted
that they used a slightly different version of the survey task that added a self-referent
component to the emotional stimuli presented. Taken together with findings from the
current study, it appears that the emotional version of the JTC task has yielded
inconsistent results regarding effectiveness of the task in producing an emotion effect.
Other possible factors that may have contributed to the lack of a statistically
significant emotion effect in the JTC task include the limit placed on information
available to a participant before a conclusion is reached, and the limited number of
participants who displayed an extreme responding style. In the current study, participants
were given up to 10 possible pieces of information (names in the neutral condition and
personality traits in the emotional condition) before they were essentially forced to make
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a decision. Though previous studies using the JTC task often do not state whether or not
such a limit was in place, some have reported a limit of 20 units of information using the
specific versions of the task employed in the current study (Warman et al., 2007). In the
current study, a somewhat arbitrary cutoff of 10 pieces of information was selected based
on the notion that basic limits on working memory would limit the usefulness of
increasing units of information past a certain point. In other words, since the current
study did not include a memory aid, it was reasoned that by the time a participant was
given a 15th clue, they would likely have forgotten the first clue. Coupled with previously
published mean and standard deviation scores on this task, 10 units of information
appeared to be a reasonable cutoff point. However, an examination of the raw data
revealed that a number of participants, particularly in the control group, requested the
maximum 10 pieces of information on both the neutral and emotional conditions. It is
possible that employing a limit of 20 possible pieces of information would have yielded
larger group differences, thus affecting the results of statistical analyses related to the
presence and magnitude of emotion effects.
Another trend that became apparent when examining the raw scores on the JTC
task is the relatively low number of participants showing a “jumping to conclusions
reasoning style,” which is defined as coming to a conclusion after two or fewer trials
(Garety et al., 2005). While this index of performance was not used in any of the data
analysis, an examination of these scores revealed that participants in the current study did
not perform as expected given previous reports that 40 – 70% of individuals with
delusions make decisions after one or two draws (White & Mansell, 2009). In the current
study, the percentage of participants in the schizophrenia group (most of whom reported
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delusions) with this JTC reasoning style was noticeably lower (12% in the neutral
condition; 20% in the emotional condition). Furthermore, it has been reported that
between 10 – 20% of healthy controls show the JTC reasoning style (Freeman, 2007),
however in the current study no controls demonstrated this pattern of performance on
either task condition. Therefore, it appears that while mean scores on the task obtained in
the current study are comparable with past reports, this may be more related to the limit
placed on available pieces of information combined with relatively few participants
demonstrating the JTC reasoning style.
Findings from the JTC and word recall task showed no emotion effect within
groups, and no difference in the size of the emotion effect between groups. It is
somewhat puzzling, however, that the schizophrenia group did not show a larger emotion
effect than the control group on the emotional Stroop task, considering that this group
demonstrated the predicted emotion effect, while the control group did not. However, an
examination of the means and standard deviations of Stroop RT values in both groups
provides qualitative information about observed performance patterns in the groups that
may shed some light on this finding. Although the difference in RT values between
conditions was statistically significant only in the schizophrenia group, both groups
performed faster in the neutral condition and displayed similar amounts of variability
among RT values. The degree of the difference between neutral and emotional conditions
was slightly larger in the schizophrenia group, which accounts for the finding that this
group showed the predicted emotion effect. When this effect is compared between groups
however, there is no hint of a difference, and this is likely due to the fact that overall, the
groups performed very similarly.
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In what appears to be the first study using the emotional Stroop task to investigate
attentional bias in individuals with delusions, Bentall and Kaney (1989) reported that
individuals with persecutory delusions showed a greater degree of interference (i.e. a
larger emotion effect) for paranoia words compared to both a depression and control
group. Interestingly, these authors reported that when paranoid words and depressive
words were combined to form an emotional condition and then compared to the neutral
words, there were no differences in amount of interference among the groups. Only when
the paranoid words were separated from the more general negative words (this study did
not include a positive word condition) did group differences in interference emerge
(Bentall & Kaney, 1989). In the current study, a comparable emotion effect was not
detected between the schizophrenia and the control group. Partially consistent with the
findings described by Bentall and Kaney (1989), the current study did detect an emotion
effect within the schizophrenia group, specifically this group performed faster in the
neutral versus emotional task condition. However, unlike Bentall and Kaney (1989), the
current study did not observe an emotion effect in the control group.
In a different study investigating attentional bias to emotionally salient material in
individuals with persecutory delusions, it was reported that the persecutory group
demonstrated an emotion effect for both positive and negative words (compared to
neutral words), and that this effect was larger in the delusion group compared to the
control group, whose performance did not differ as a function of word type (Kinderman,
1994). However, this author used negative and positive self-esteem adjectives versus
neutral adjectives in their emotional Stroop task. Again, results of the current study are
partially consistent in that there was an emotion effect in the schizophrenia group and the
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absence of an emotion effect in the control group, however there was no difference in the
magnitude of emotion effect between the groups.
The reason(s) for the apparent mix of consistent and inconsistent findings among
these studies and the current study are not immediately clear, though it is possible that
task differences placed a role. Both Bentall and Kaney (1989) and Kinderman (1994)
used a card version of the Stroop task, which provides a less fine grained approach to
measuring reaction time compared to the computerized version of the task used in the
current study. Task stimuli in the emotion condition also differed significantly among all
three studies, with the current study using negative and positive emotion words, Bentall
and Kaney employing paranoia and depressive words, and Kinderman using positive and
negative self-esteem adjectives. Compared to both of these previous studies, the
emotional stimuli used in the current study was of a more general nature and no attempt
was made to ensure that emotion words would be personally relevant to the delusion
group. Additionally, both of these studies utilized a persecutory delusion group, while the
current study used a mixed delusion group.
The combination of these two factors may have been of particular importance in
determining the nature of an emotion effect in the current study given previous findings
described by Fear and colleagues (1996a). In their study of individuals with delusional
disorder (a subset of whom had persecutory delusions), the delusion group as a whole
displayed greater interference for threatening words compared to controls (who showed
no emotion effect), however individuals within the delusion group with non-persecutory
delusions also showed greater interference for other types of emotionally salient words
(anxiety and sadness words) compared to controls (Fear, Sharpy, & Healy, 1996a). In a
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separate publication utilizing the same sample, it was reported that medication status also
had an effect on task performance, in that the unmedicated group showed a greater degree
of interference for threat and anxiety valenced words compared to medicated patients
with delusional disorder (Fear & Healy, 1996b). Taken together, these prior studies seem
to highlight the importance of using words that are not just emotionally salient, but also
have self-referent value, a factor which may then differ depending on other features such
as delusion subtype and even medication status.
In an investigation of emotional Stroop performance in individuals with
schizophrenia who were subdivided based on PANSS symptom ratings, it was
hypothesized that severity of negative symptoms would be related to a greater emotion
effect for negative words (Demily et al., 2009). Of all of the studies discussed thus far,
this one used a task that most closely approximated the one in the current study – a
computerized emotional Stroop task containing neutral words and positively and
negatively valenced emotion words selected to minimize personal relevance to
participants. Though these authors were primarily interested in differences in the negative
syndrome patients, they included a positive symptom subgroup and a control group, thus
several findings from the current study can be compared to that of Demily et al. (2009).
Consistent with findings from the current study showing no difference in the size of
emotion effects between the groups, these authors reported that the schizophrenia group
(combining positive and negative patients) showed the same degree of interference for
emotion words as controls. In this study, the schizophrenia group responded more slowly
overall compared to controls on all task conditions (in the current study, this finding was
a statistical trend). Demily et al. (2009) also reported that, although both the
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schizophrenia group and control group demonstrated an emotion effect (both groups were
faster in the neutral condition), there was no significant difference between RT as a
function of valence within or between the groups. This finding was partially consistent
with that of the current study, which found that while task valence had an impact on
overall performance (both groups performed better with positive words compared to
negative words), there were no between group differences as a function of valence.
Finally, these authors also reported that there was no difference in emotion effect related
to severity of either negative or positive symptoms as measured by the PANSS (Demily
et al., 2009). In the current study, there was no difference in emotion effect related to
delusion-proneness.
So far, the discussion of the emotion effect in the current study has focused on
differences within or between participants based on diagnostic groups that categorize
them by schizophrenia status. However, throughout this discussion, previous literature
that has been referred to frequently employs other approaches to group assignment,
namely 1) grouping participants by delusion or positive symptom status; and 2) selecting
or grouping participants by delusion subtype (primarily persecutory subtypes). Although
diagnostic category was considered a relevant grouping factor in the current study, an
alternative method for investigating potential differences in the emotion effect was also
used. All participants were administered a measure of delusion-proneness (the PDI) and
scores from this measure were entered as a covariate in all analyses in order to explore
the possibility that the emotion effect was more closely related to delusion-proneness
rather than diagnostic group. This hypothesis was not supported, as the interaction
between task condition and PDI total score was not significant in any of the previously
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described analyses of emotion effects. Additionally, exploratory analyses investigating
whether a particular dimension of delusion-proneness was associated with the emotion
effect were not statistically significant for any of the cognitive tasks administered.
Previous research has suggested that investigating cognitive biases in individuals
with schizophrenia may mask the presence of putative deficits that are specific to
individual symptoms such as delusions (Aleman & David, 2006). These authors have
advocated the approach of investigating single symptoms of the disorder in order to
determine what factors maintain or even predict those symptoms. Previous research has
also suggested that characteristic reasoning and attention biases appear to be related to
delusions, and that concurrent processing of emotional stimuli may amplify these biases
(Freeman & Garety, 2003). In the current study, this question was addressed by
examining whether emotion effects would increase as the severity of delusional
proneness increased across all participants. While it was expected that delusionproneness would be related to the degree of emotion effects on all tasks regardless of
diagnostic group, this was not the case. Given the previously discussed finding that the
magnitude of emotion effects did not differ between the groups for any of the tasks, the
findings with the PDI are not entirely surprising when considering that PDI scores were
also higher in the schizophrenia group. In other words, since there a good degree of
overlap between diagnostic group and increased delusion-proneness, the two hypotheses
were not getting at entirely independent questions. Still, past studies have reported that
differences that may not be apparent between diagnostic groups are apparent when
considering level of delusion-proneness. For instance, in an investigation of the JTC datagathering bias, a difference in performance was detected when participants were grouped
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by delusion status, but this difference disappeared when participants were grouped by
diagnosis (Peters et al., 2007). It was therefore plausible to predict that the PDI total score
or perhaps one of the dimension scores from the measure would be more sensitive to
differences in performance between the neutral and emotion conditions in each set of
cognitive tasks. It is worth noting again that in general, there was little variation in
performance between the neutral versus emotional task conditions. Had the predicted
emotion effects emerged, the finding that PDI score was not related to degree of emotion
effect would be more meaningful. For this reason, though results of the current study
provide no direct support for the theory that increased delusion-proneness is uniquely
related to a deficit in processing emotional stimuli during cognitive performance (at least
not on the tasks employed here), these results should not be considered conclusive.
The lack of the presence of an emotion effect in all tasks except the emotional
Stroop task in the schizophrenia group presents a challenge when attempting to fit the
current findings with theoretical accounts of cognitive and emotional processes in
delusions. Irrespective of the emotional effects, the current study did find overall support
for the presence of group differences in basic cognitive task performance, though the
group difference in the emotional Stroop task was a statistical trend. These findings add
to the established literature describing reasoning and attention biases in individuals with
schizophrenia. However, the main aim of the current study was to test hypotheses related
to theories of the relationship between cognitive and emotional processing related to
delusional thought. For instance, Garety et al. (2007) have suggested that emotion plays a
direct role in the development of delusions via the influence of affective processes on
cognitive appraisals. Though the current study did not directly assess the role of cognition
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or emotion in delusional development, it could be argued that the findings do not support
the general idea that emotional processes impact cognitive processes in a different or
unique way in individuals with delusions. However, this conclusion fails to account for
many alternative explanations for the findings presented here. Though several possible
shortcomings of the actual measures have already been discussed, there is the larger issue
of the generalizability of laboratory simulations of the presumably complex cognitive and
emotional processes that lead an individual to develop and maintain an intricate web of
delusional beliefs. It is difficult to design tasks that assess the most relevant thought
processes underlying delusions. However, it is encouraging that a growing body of past
research has shown specific tasks, such as the JTC task, to be useful in assessing a
particular reasoning bias that does appear to be related in some way to the presence of
delusions. It is also promising that findings from the current study do suggest that
participants in the group comprised primarily of individuals with delusions did not
perform as well as healthy controls on the tasks as a whole. The failure to detect larger
emotion effects in this study may indicate that the added presence of an emotional
component did not hinder cognitive processing on the tasks administered in any
appreciable way in individuals with schizophrenia. Alternatively, it may very well be that
material must be emotionally salient to delusion content in order for significant effects to
emerge, or that emotion interacts with cognition at some other stage or in a different
manner than what was assessed in the current study. Therefore, it would be premature to
assume that an individual’s lack of preferential recall of emotional words related to a
psychiatric diagnosis or self-ratings of delusional thought disproves the notion that
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cognitive and emotional processes are working together to maintain this individual’s
delusions.
Several limitations of the current study have been discussed, including potential
constraints of the task versions used, effectiveness of the emotion stimuli selected, and
methods of grouping participants. Other limitations include those related to demographic
features, sample size, and the reliance of self-report ratings on one of the measures. In
terms of group composition, gender was unevenly divided in both groups, with males
comprising approximately two thirds of each group. The schizophrenia group was not
matched to the control group on years of education, though they were matched on the
premorbid estimate of intelligence and parental education. Though a power analysis
suggested that the sample size (25 participants in each group) was likely sufficient to
detect group differences in the current study, there were other limitations imposed by the
relatively small number of participants in each group. Given the pattern of results, it may
have been informative, as an exploratory analysis, to examine the impact of delusion
subtype (e.g., persecutory, grandiose) on performance. Though this information can be
gleaned from the PDI, a substantially larger number of participants would be needed in
order to get adequate numbers of individuals from each subtype. The use of the PDI
could also be considered a limitation, as this measure relies on self-report of individuals
from a population that may be hesitant to answer or endorse certain items due to paranoia
or other illness factors (e.g., poor insight). However, observer ratings of symptoms in the
current study indicate agreement between observed and self-reported symptoms related to
delusions. In particular, there was a statistically significant relationship between the SCIPANSS Positive symptom score (observer-ratings based on a structured interview) and
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the self-report total score from the PDI (r = 0.72, p < 0.001), suggesting considerable
overlap between symptoms that were observed and assessed by the experimenter and
those that were reported by participants in the schizophrenia group.
Despite these limitations, results of the current study are useful for guiding future
research. Taken together with much of the theoretical and applied research that has been
reviewed, results of the current study suggest a need for a more thorough evaluation of
optimal methods for creating emotional versions of the tasks. Once a reliable method for
inducing emotion in healthy controls is determined, this method can be tested in patient
groups and then in relation to individual symptoms. It is possible that what constitutes an
emotionally salient task in one group is different for another group, and so the possibility
of a more fine grained approach to altering stimuli could be explored. Alternatively or in
addition, future studies may want to include participant ratings of stimuli from both
conditions in order to ensure that neutral stimuli is really perceived as neutral and
emotional stimuli as emotional. The use of realistic scenarios to explore emotional
salience may also be preferable to more contrived laboratory based manipulations, though
this is often time consuming and tends to create added variance from uncontrolled
variables. Overall, it seems that future studies using improved methods for increasing
emotional salience of task stimuli would better address questions regarding magnitude of
emotion effects.
Apart from the findings related to emotion effects, the finding that individuals in
the schizophrenia group generally performed more poorly than the control group on the
cognitive tasks administered could also inform future research. To date, the line of work
investigating the treatment of cognitive deficits in individuals with schizophrenia and/or
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delusions is quite new. In a very recent study, it was reported that a brief session of
‘reasoning training’ was associated with improved performance on the JTC task in
individuals with delusions and a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Ross et al., 2009). These
authors also reported that, subsequent to reasoning training, some participants reported
increased flexibility and decreased conviction of delusional beliefs, though this finding
was not statistically significant. Future research should continue to explore the
mechanisms underlying the cognitive processes of delusional thought so that more
refined approaches to treatment can be developed and tested, as the need to improve the
everyday emotional functioning of individuals with delusions is undeniably tied to
symptom reduction or relief.
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APPENDIX A: PHONE SCREENING FORM (CONTROL GROUP)
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PHONE SCREEN FOR CONTROL GROUP
Full Name of Potential Participant:
Phone Number:
(
)
Date of Phone Screen:
/
/

Interviewer Initials:

“Hi. My name is ________ and I’m calling from the Psychology Department at the University of
Central Florida in response to the phone message that you left, indicating interest in our research
study. May I ask how you learned about our study?” (USE ANSWER TO DETERMINE
WHETHER CONTROL OR SCHIZOPHRENIA PROBAND)
“Before I explain the study, we need to determine whether you are eligible for this particular
study. What is your current age? ________ (note: exclude if under 18 or over 60). To see if you
are eligible, I will list a series of statements and, at the end of the list, you will say "yes" or "no"
to indicate whether you would answer at least one of the items from the list as being true for you.
In this way, we will not know which items from the list are true for you, in order to protect your
confidentiality. Please think about each item after I read it, but only answer "yes" or "no" after
I've read all items. Please answer “no” unless you are fairly sure that an item applies to you. Do
you have any questions or concerns about this before I begin the list?
Exclusion List (Only get a "yes" or "no" at the very end of each list – NOT after each item):
•

"At some point in my life, I got hit in the head so hard that I blacked out for more than 10
minutes."

•

"I've experienced one or more seizures after the age of 5."

•

"I've been diagnosed with a stroke, brain tumor, or other serious neurological disorder - like
Parkinson’s disease."

•

"In the past month, I have used alcohol or drugs to the point that it affected my functioning at
school, work, or personal relationships."

•

"During at least one point in my life, I received inpatient hospitalization for alcohol or drug
dependence."

"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just
listed?" YES / NO (IF YES, skip to below)
"Now we will do the same thing with another list of items. Please remember to wait until the end
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you."
•

"I am color blind to some extent."

•

"I currently have significant problems with my vision, even when wearing glasses or
contacts."

•

"I have significant difficulty with moving or feeling the arm or hand that I use for writing."
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•

"I have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, autism, Asperger’s disorder, or
schizoaffective disorder at some point in my life."

•

"I have a family member who I'm biologically related to, who has been diagnosed with
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder at some point in their life."

"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just
listed?" YES / NO (IF YES, skip to below)
"Now we will do the same thing with one last set of items. Please remember to wait until the end
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you."
•

“I have been diagnosed with AIDS, Lupus, congestive heart disease, or insulin-dependent
diabetes.”

•

“I have been diagnosed with dyslexia or another specific learning disability.”

•

“I have had surgery on my nose or sinuses.”

•

"English is not the first language that I spoke as a child."

•

“I have received electroconvulsive therapy in the past six months.”

•

“I have been prescribed antipsychotic medication at some point in my life.”

"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just
listed?" YES / NO (IF YES, skip to below)
If "YES" to any list above – "Thank you for your openness with this procedure. Unfortunately,
you do not qualify for this particular study because you endorsed at least one of these factors
which could influence your performance on the tasks in our study. We appreciate your time
completing this brief phone screen. Do you have any questions I can address?"
IF "NO" – "Thanks for going through this list with me. It sounds like you qualify for participation
in our study. Can I give you a brief overview of what the study involves, so that you can decide if
you'd like to participate?"
“We are conducting a study to examine differences in thinking ability and perception as it relates
to a psychiatric disorder called schizophrenia. We are interested in having you participate in a
community comparison group so that we can look at differences in your performance with the
performance of individuals with schizophrenia and their family members. We hope to gain
information that may lead to better treatment or ways to prevent schizophrenia.”
"The study will take place in our research laboratory in the Psychology Building on the main
campus of the University of Central Florida in east Orlando. You will be provided with detailed
directions and free parking in front of the building. During this meeting, we will interview you
about your mental and physical health and you will be asked to complete some questionnaires
about psychological experiences you may have had. After this interview, we will ask you to
complete a series of thinking ability and perception tasks. We would also like to collect a sample
of your DNA by swabbing the inside of your cheek with a small brush. All information you
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provide will remain strictly confidential. Your name will not be used in any report or
presentation. This meeting would last about 3.5 hours. You will be paid by check at the end of the
meeting at the rate of $8 for each 30 minutes of participation, so you can expect to be paid
approximately $56, although the exact time and amount may vary slightly for each participant.
"Are there any questions or concerns about that I can address for you?"
"Are you willing to participate, with the understanding that you can discontinue participation at
any point, for any reason, without penalty?"
IF SO – schedule date and time: ____________________________
"I have a map and directions to send you to help you find our building. Would you prefer that I email, fax, or mail these to you?" (INCLUDE INFORMATION BELOW) - Send our cover letter
with appointment date and time, along with map/directions.
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APPENDIX B: PHONE SCREENING FORM (SCHIZOPHRENIA
GROUP)
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PHONE SCREEN FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA GROUP
Full Name of Potential Participant:
Phone Number:
(
)
Date of Phone Screen:
/
/

Interviewer Initials:

“Hi. My name is _________ and I’m calling from the Psychology Department at the University
of Central Florida in response to the phone message that you left, indicating interest in our
research study. May I ask how you learned about our study?” (USE ANSWER TO DETERMINE
WHETHER CONTROL OR SCHIZOPHRENIA PROBAND)
“Before I explain the study, we need to determine whether you are eligible for this particular
study. What is your current age? ________ (Note: exclude if under 18 or over 60).
•
•

Has a doctor told you that have a diagnosis of schizophrenia? YES / NO
What are the names of the medications that you are currently prescribed (do not need
doses – ask participant to look at their prescription bottles if unsure):
__________________

__________________

__________________

__________________

__________________

__________________

(Note: Needs to report a diagnosis of schizophrenia from some type of doctor/psychologist. Also,
needs to be currently prescribed some type of antipsychotic medication. Otherwise, explain these
criteria and discontinue screen).
To see if you are eligible, I will list a series of statements and, at the end of the list, you will say
"yes" or "no" to indicate whether you would answer at least one of the items from the list as being
true for you. In this way, we will not know which items from the list are true for you, in order to
protect your confidentiality. Please think about each item after I read it, but only answer "yes" or
"no" after I've read all items. Please answer “no” unless you are fairly sure that an item applies to
you. Do you have any questions or concerns about this before I begin the list?
Exclusion List (Only get a "yes" or "no" at the very end of each list – NOT after each item):
•

"At some point in my life, I got hit in the head so hard that I blacked out for more than 10
minutes."

•

"I've experienced one or more seizures after the age of 5."

•

"I've been diagnosed with a stroke, brain tumor, or other serious neurological disorder - like
Parkinson’s disease."

•

"In the past month, I have used alcohol or drugs to the point that it affected my functioning at
school, work, or personal relationships."

•

"During at least one point in my life, I received inpatient hospitalization for alcohol or drug
dependence."
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"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just
listed?" YES / NO (IF YES, skip to below)
"Now we will do the same thing with another list of items. Please remember to wait until the end
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you."
•

"I am color blind to some extent."

•

"I currently have significant problems with my vision, even when wearing glasses or
contacts."

•

"I have significant difficulty with moving or feeling the arm or hand that I use for writing."

•

“I have received electroconvulsive therapy in the past six months.”

"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just
listed?" YES / NO (IF YES, skip to below)
"Now we will do the same thing with one last set of items. Please remember to wait until the end
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you."
•

“I have been diagnosed with AIDS, Lupus, congestive heart disease, or insulin-dependent
diabetes.”

•

“I have been diagnosed with dyslexia or another specific learning disability.”

•

“I have had surgery on my nose or sinuses.”

•

“English is not the first language that I spoke as a child.”

"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just
listed?" YES / NO (IF YES, skip to below)
If "YES" to any list above – "Thank you for your openness with this procedure. Unfortunately,
you do not qualify for this particular study because you endorsed at least one of these factors
which could influence your performance on the tasks in our study. We appreciate your time
completing this brief phone screen. Do you have any questions I can address?"
IF "NO" – "Thanks for going through this list with me. It sounds like you qualify for participation
in our study. Can I give you a brief overview of what the study involves, so that you can decide if
you'd like to participate?"
“We are conducting a study to examine differences in thinking ability and perception as it relates
to schizophrenia. We are interested in having you participate in the group of individuals who have
schizophrenia, so that we can compare the performance to individuals without schizophrenia. We
hope to gain information that may one day lead to better treatment or ways to prevent
schizophrenia.”
"The study will take place in our research laboratory in the Psychology Building on the main
campus of the University of Central Florida in east Orlando. You will be provided with detailed
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directions and free parking in front of the building. During this meeting, we will interview you
about your mental and physical health and you will be asked to complete some questionnaires
about psychological experiences you may have had. After this interview, we will ask you to
complete a series of thinking ability and perception tasks. We would also like to collect a sample
of your DNA by swabbing the inside of your cheek with a small brush. All information you
provide will remain strictly confidential. Your name will not be used in any report or
presentation. This meeting would last about 4 hours. You will be paid by check at the end of the
meeting at the rate of $8 for each 30 minutes of participation, so you can expect to be paid
approximately $64, although the exact time and amount may vary slightly for each participant.
"Are there any questions or concerns about that I can address for you?"
"Are you willing to participate, with the understanding that you can discontinue participation at
any point, for any reason, without penalty?"
IF SO – schedule date and time: ____________________________
"I have a map and directions to send you to help you find our building. Would you prefer that I email, fax, or mail these to you?" (INCLUDE INFORMATION BELOW) - Send our cover letter
with appointment date and time, along with map/directions.
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TITLE: Cognitive Functioning in Schizophrenia
Investigator:
Supervisor:

Diana Orem, M.S., Doctoral Student
Jeffrey S. Bedwell, Ph.D., Assistant Professor,
Department of Psychology, University of Central Florida,
Orlando, FL

CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Introduction
You are being invited to participate in the research as titled above. Your participation is
entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or withdraw your consent
at any time without giving reason and without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. You may ask to have your information removed from the research
records or destroyed. You will be one of approximately 50 participants in this research
study.
Purpose
The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between thinking ability/
perception and schizophrenia. We are also interested in the genetic transmission of these
factors. A better understanding of these relationships may provide information that leads
to better treatment and ways to prevent schizophrenia.
Duration and Location
Your participation is anticipated to last between 4 and 4.5 hours (although this varies by
participant) and will take place in the Clinical Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory (Rm.
137) in the Psychology Building on the main campus of the University of Central Florida
(east Orlando).
Procedures
During this study, the following will occur:
1. You will answer questions about basic demographic information.
2. You will participate in a psychological interview about psychological and medical
history and current psychological symptoms.
3. You will complete some self-report scales of emotional and psychological
experiences.
4. You will complete a series of tasks that measure your smell ability and emotional
processing.
Exclusions
There are some criteria or characteristics that may make you ineligible to participate in
this study. Each potential participant will be individually evaluated for eligibility through
a two step process: 1) the initial phone screen that you’ve already completed, and 2) an
interview and measures during the first part of today’s session. If you are excluded at any
point during the session, you will be paid for your time spent up to that point.
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Early Withdrawal by You or the Investigator
If, during the course of participating in the study, you decide you do not want to continue
to participate (for any reason), please inform the investigator or a member of his research
team. You will be paid for each 30 minute interval you participated in (rounded to nearest
half hour) and will not be penalized in any way for early withdrawal.
Risks and Discomforts
In rare instances, this study may involve mild emotional discomfort due to personal
questions asked during the interview or may become frustrated by difficulty thinking
ability tasks. You do not have to answer questions which make you feel uncomfortable
and you may stop participation at any time.
Benefits
You may not receive any personal benefit from participating in this study besides being
paid for your time. The information gathered from this research may lead to better
treatments for schizophrenia.
Payment and Costs to Participation
You will not incur any costs due to your participation in this study. You will receive a
check for $8 per half hour that you participated (rounded to the nearest half hour) at the
end of the research session. The total length of the session is estimated at 4 to 4.5 hours,
which translates to a payment between $64 and $72, although this will vary by
participant. If you decline to participate during this informed consent procedure, you will
not receive payment.
New Findings
You will be given any new information gained during the course of this study that might
affect your willingness to continue participation in the study.
Confidentiality
Every effort will be taken to protect your identity. This form, which contains your name,
will be kept in a separate secure file cabinet from the rest of your information from the
study. Questionnaires and tests will not include your name. You will not be identified in
any presentation or publication of this study or its results. Your DNA sample will be
stored in a container that only has a random ID# and date written on it. Please note: we
may have to notify the proper authorities (without your permission) if you lead us to
believe that you are in imminent danger of physically harming yourself or others.
Questions
If you have questions regarding the study, you may call Jeffrey Bedwell, Ph.D. at 407823-5858 or e-mail him at jbedwell@mail.ucf.edu.
Injury
If you believe you have been injured during participation in this research project, you
may file a claim with UCF Environmental Health & Safety, Risk and Insurance Office,
P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL 32816-3500 (407) 823-6300. The University of Central
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Florida is an agency of the State of Florida for purposes of sovereign immunity and the
university’s and the state’s liability for personal injury or property damage is extremely
limited under Florida law. Accordingly, the university’s and the state’s ability to
compensate you for any personal injury or property damage suffered during this research
project is very limited.
Consent to Participate
My signature below indicates that I agree with the information described above and
voluntarily agree to participate in this study. Any questions I have about this study have
been clearly answered.
Authorization and Signatures
I am the Research Participant or am authorized to act on behalf of the Research
Participant. I have read this Authorization, and I will receive a copy of this
Authorization after it is signed.
_________________________________
Signature of Research Participant or
Research Participant’s Legal Representative*

________________________
Date

________________________________
Printed Name of Research Participant or
Research Participant’s Legal Representative*

________________________
Representative’s Relationship
to Research Participant

*Please explain Representative’s Relationship to Research Participant and include a
description of Representative’s Authority to act on behalf of Research Participant:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Signature/Printed Name of Person Obtaining Informed Consent
Date
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This questionnaire is designed to measure beliefs and vivid mental experiences. We
believe that they are much more common than has previously been supposed, and that
most people have had some such experiences during their lives.
Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or
wrong answers, and there are no trick questions.
Please note that we are NOT interested in experiences people may have had when under
the influence of drugs.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS
For the questions you answer YES to, we are interested in:
(a) how distressing these beliefs or experiences are
(b) how often you think about them
(c) how true you believe them to be.
Below each question, please circle the number which corresponds most closely to how
distressing this belief is, how often you think about it, and how much you believe that it
is true.
Examples:
Do you ever feel as if people are reading your mind?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

Do you ever feel as if you can read other people’s mind?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(1) Do you ever feel as if you are under the control of some force or power other than
yourself?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(2) Do you ever feel as if you are a robot or zombie without a will of your own?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(3) Do you ever feel as if you are possessed by someone or something else?
NO YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(4) Do you ever feel as if your feelings or actions are not under your control?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(5) Do you ever feel as if someone or something is playing games with your mind?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(6) Do you ever feel as if people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a double
meaning?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(7) Do you ever feel as if things in magazines or on TV were written especially for you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(8) Do you ever think that everyone is gossiping about you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(9) Do you ever feel as if some people are not what they seem to be?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(10) Do things around you ever feel unreal, as though it was all part of an experiment?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(11) Do you ever feel as if someone is deliberately trying to harm you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(12) Do you ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some way?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(13) Do you ever feel as if there is a conspiracy against you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(14) Do you ever feel as if some organization or institution has it in for you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(15) Do you ever feel, as if someone or something is watching you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(16) Do you ever feel as if you have special abilities or powers?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(17) Do you ever feel as if there is a special purpose or mission to your life?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(18) Do you ever feel as if there is a mysterious power working for the good of the
world?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(19) Do you ever feel as if you are or destined to be someone very important?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(20) Do you ever feel that you are a very special or unusual person?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(21) Do you ever feel that you are especially close to God?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(22) Do you ever think that people can communicate telepathically?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(23) Do you ever feel as if electrical devices such as computers can influence the way
you think?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(24) Do you ever feel as if there are forces around you which affect you in strange ways?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(25) Do you ever feel as if you have been chosen by God in some way?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(26) Do you believe in the power of witchcraft, voodoo, or the occult?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(27) Are you often worried that your partner may be unfaithful?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(28) Do you ever think that you smell very unusual to other people?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(29) Do you ever feel as if your body is changing in a peculiar way?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(30) Do you ever think that strangers want to have sex with you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(31) Do you ever feel that you have sinned more than the average person?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(32) Do you ever feel that people look at you oddly because of your appearance?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(33) Do you ever feel as if you had no thoughts in your head at all?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(34) Do you ever feel as if your insides might be rotting?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(35) Do you ever feel as if the world is about to end?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(36) Do your thoughts ever feel alien to you in some way?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(37) Have your thoughts ever been so vivid that you were worried other people would
hear them?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(38) Do you ever feel as if your own thoughts were being echoed back to you?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(39) Do you ever feel as if your thoughts were blocked by someone or something else?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

(40) Do you ever feel as if other people can read your mind?
NO
YES ↓
If YES:
Not at all
1
distressing
Hardly ever 1
think about it
Don’t believe 1
it’s true

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4
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Very
5
Distressing
Think about 5
it all the time
Believe it is 5
absolutely true

APPENDIX E: IRB APPROVAL LETTER

110

University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board
Office of Research & Commercialization
12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501
Orlando, Florida 32826-3246
Telephone: 407 823-2901, 407 882-2901 or 407 882-2276
www.research.ucf.edu/compliance/irb.html

Notice of Expedited Initial Review and Approval
From : UCF Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351, Exp. 5/07/10, IRB00001138
To : Jeffrey S. Bedwell and Kiminobu Sugaya
Date : February 14, 2008
IRB Number: SBE-08-05420
Study Title: Neurocognitive Functioning in Schizophrenia
Dear Researcher:
Your research protocol noted above was approved by expedited review by the UCF IRB Chair on
2/14/2008. The expiration date is 2/13/2009. Your study was determined to be minimal risk for human
subjects and expeditable per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.110. The categories for which this study
qualifies as expeditable research are as follows:
2. Collection of blood samples by finger stick, heel stick, ear stick, or venipuncture as follows: (a) Subjects
are healthy, nonpregnant adults who weigh at least 110 pounds; amounts drawn may not exceed 550 ml
over 8 weeks; and collection may not occur more frequently than 2 times per week. or (b) Subjects are
other adults and children, considering the age, weight, and health of the subjects the collection procedure;
the amount of blood to be collected; and the frequency with which it will be collected. For these subjects,
the amount collected may not exceed the lesser of 50 ml or 3 ml per kg over 8 weeks, and collection may
not occur more frequently than 2 times per week.
7. Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on
perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and
social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation,
human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.
The IRB has approved a consent procedure which requires participants to sign consent forms. Use of
the approved, stamped consent document(s) is required. Only approved investigators (or other approved
key study personnel) may solicit consent for research participation. Subjects or their representatives must
receive a copy of the consent form(s). All data, which may include signed consent form documents, must
be retained in a locked file cabinet for a minimum of three years (six if HIPAA applies) past the completion
of this research. Any links to the identification of participants should be maintained on a password-
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protected computer if electronic information is used. Additional requirements may be imposed by your
funding agency, your department, or other entities. Access to data is limited to authorized individuals listed
as key study personnel.
To continue this research beyond the expiration date, a Continuing Review Form must be submitted 2 – 4
weeks prior to the expiration date. Advise the IRB if you receive a subpoena for the release of this
information, or if a breach of confidentiality occurs. Also report any unanticipated problems or serious
adverse events (within 5 working days). Do not make changes to the protocol methodology or consent form
before obtaining IRB approval. Changes can be submitted for IRB review using the
Addendum/Modification Request Form. An Addendum/Modification Request Form cannot be used to
extend the approval period of a study. All forms may be completed and submitted online at
http://iris.research.ucf.edu .
Failure to provide a continuing review report could lead to study suspension, a loss of funding and/or
publication possibilities, or reporting of noncompliance to sponsors or funding agencies. The IRB
maintains the authority under 45 CFR 46.110(e) to observe or have a third party observe the consent
process and the research.
On behalf of Tracy Dietz, Ph.D., UCF IRB Chair, this letter is signed by:
Signature applied by Joanne Muratori on 02/14/2008 04:59:45 PM EST

IRB Coordinator
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Figure 1. Comparison of Schizophrenia and Control Group Reaction Times on Neutral
and Emotional Conditions of the Emotional Stroop Task

Schizophrenia group difference: p = 0.04*
Control group difference: p = 0.28
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Table 1. Group Differences on Demographic and Clinical Characteristics

Measure
Gender (male)a

Schizophrenia group (n = 25)

Control group (n = 25)

64%

64%

Age

39.61 (11.92)

39.57 (11.13)

Years of education

12.2 (1.8)**

14.2 (1.9)**

Race: Causcasiana

56%

56%

Race: African Americana

28%

28%

Race: Hispanica

4%

8%

Race: Asiana

4%

0%

Race: Mixed/Biraciala

8%

8%

WRAT Standard score

97.92 (10.30)

101.84 (9.42)

185.48 (113.77)**

52.64 (48.64)**

PDI Yes/No score

15.64 (8.79)**

5.84 (4.62)**

PDI Distress score

52.72 (33.75)**

11.64 (13.29)**

PDI Preoccupation score

52.84 (33.24)**

15.52 (15.14)**

PDI Conviction score

64.28 (41.16)**

19.64 (17.54)**

PANSS Composite score

2.28 (6.76)

--

PANSS Positive score

20.36 (5.20)

--

PANSS Negative score

18.08 (4.23)

--

PANSS General score

37.08 (6.91)

--

PANSS Delusions score

4.04 (1.24)

--

PDI Total score

*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001
Values represent means and standard deviations for all variables except those notated (a indicates a
percentage).
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Table 2. Cognitive Task Performance: Means and Standard Deviations

Measure

Schizophrenia group (n = 25)

Control group (n = 25)

E-Stroop RT: Neutral

784.67 (122.43)

690.59 (119.04)

E-Stroop RT: Emotion

824.93 (127.56)

704.65 (159.77)

E-Stroop RT: Negative words

841.42 (139.91)

808.44 (123.14)

E-Stroop RT: Positive words

714.13 (168.10)

695.17 (153.01)

Word Recall: Neutral

2.72 (1.92)

3.88 (1.69)

Word Recall: Emotion

2.72 (1.67)

4.16 (1.57)

Word Recall: Negative words

1.40 (1.12)

2.00 (1.35)

Word Recall: Positive words

1.28 (1.17)

2.16 (1.57)

JTC: Neutral

6.19 (2.57)

8.57 (1.36)

JTC: Emotion

5.84 (2.82)

8.34 (1.70)

Scores for the emotional Stroop (E-Stroop) task indicate reaction time in each condition in milliseconds.
Scores for the word recall task indicate number words recalled. Scores for the JTC task indicate number of
trials to reach a decision on that task.
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Table 3. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Mixed ANCOVA Results Hypothesis 1
Main Effect of Group

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Effect size (η2)

E-Stroop Taska

(1 ,46)

2.91

0.10†

0.06

Word Recall Taskb

(1, 46)

7.28

0.01*

0.14

JTC Taskc

(1, 46)

4.82

0.03*

0.10

N = 50
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or
neutral); covariate = PDI total score; DVa = reaction time; DVb = words recalled; DVc = trials to decision.
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the schizophrenia group will perform more poorly on the cognitive tasks (both
conditions combined within each task) compared to the performance of control group.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)

Table 4. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Paired Samples T-tests Hypothesis 2
Task & Group

Degrees of freedom

t value

p value

Effect size (d)

E-Stroop: Schizophrenia

(1, 24)

2.19

0.04*

0.44

E-Stroop: Control

(1, 24)

1.10

0.28

0.22

Word Recall: Schizophrenia

(1, 24)

0.00

1.00

< 0.001

Word Recall: Control

(1, 24)

0.55

0.59

0.11

JTC Task: Schizophrenia

(1, 24)

0.99

0.33

0.20

JTC Task: Control

(1, 24)

0.63

0.53

0.12

N = 25
Hypothesis 2: Within each group, there will be a statistically significant emotion effect between task
conditions for each set of tasks, indicated by a difference in performance on the emotional compared to
neutral task conditions.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)
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Table 5. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Mixed ANCOVA Results Hypothesis 3
Condition X Group Interaction

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Effect size (η2)

E-Stroop Taska

(1 ,46)

0.01

0.93

0.01

Word Recall Taskb

(1, 46)

0.98

0.33

0.02

JTC Taskc

(1, 46)

0.34

0.86

0.001

N = 50
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or
neutral); covariate = PDI total score; DVa = reaction time; DVb = words recalled; DVc = trials to decision.
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the schizophrenia group will demonstrate a larger emotion effect (discrepancy
in performance between emotional and neutral task conditions) compared to the performance of control
group.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)

Table 6. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Mixed ANCOVA Results Hypothesis 4
Condition X PDI Interaction

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Effect size (η2)

E-Stroop Taska

(1 ,46)

2.12

0.15

0.04

Word Recall Taskb

(1, 46)

0.95

0.33

0.02

JTC Taskc

(1, 46)

0.62

0.43

0.01

N = 50
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or
neutral); covariate = PDI total score; DVa = reaction time; DVb = words recalled; DVc = trials to decision.
Hypothesis 4: The emotion effect will increase in all participants (regardless of group) as delusionproneness (measured by PDI total score) increases.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)
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Table 7. Exploratory Analyses of Valence: Mixed ANCOVA Results - Emotional Stroop
Task
Effect size (η2)

Main Effects & Interactions

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Main Effect of Valence

(1 ,46)

7.88

0.007*a 0.15

Valence X Group Interaction

(1, 46)

1.83

0.18

0.04

Valence X PDI Interaction

(1, 46)

0.28

0.64

0.01

N = 50
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = valence (positive or negative);
covariate = PDI total score; DV = RT value.
a
= statistically significant main effect of valence indicated that participants performed better in the positive
(versus negative) condition.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)

Table 8. Exploratory Analyses of Valence: Mixed ANCOVA Results - Word Recall Task
Main Effects & Interactions

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Effect size (η2)

Main Effect of Valence

(1 ,46)

1.07

0.31

0.02

Valence X Group Interaction

(1, 46)

0.20

0.90

< 0.001

Valence X PDI Interaction

(1, 46)

1.01

0.32

0.02

N = 50
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = valence (positive or negative);
covariate = PDI total score; DV = words recalled.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)
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Table 9. Exploratory Analyses: Emotional Stroop Task & PDI Dimension Scores Mixed
ANCOVA
Condition X Subscale Interaction

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Effect size (η2)

Condition X Distress

(1 ,46)

2.55

0.12

0.05

Group X Condition X Distress

(1, 46)

0.08

0.78

0.002

Condition X Preoccupation

(1, 46)

1.54

0.22

0.03

GroupXConditionXPreoccupation (1, 46)

0.04

0.84

0.001

Condition X Conviction

(1, 46)

1.83

0.18

0.04

Group X Condition X Conviction

(1, 46)

0.02

0.89

< 0.001

Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or
neutral); DV = words recalled; covariate = PDI Distress score, or PDI Preoccupation score, or PDI
Conviction score.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)

Table 10. Exploratory Analyses: Word Recall Task & PDI Dimension Scores Mixed
ANCOVA
Condition X Subscale Interaction

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Effect size (η2)

Condition X Distress

(1 ,46)

0.44

0.51

0.009

Group X Condition X Distress

(1, 46)

0.16

0.69

0.003

Condition X Preoccupation

(1, 46)

1.31

0.26

0.03

GroupXConditionXPreoccupation (1, 46)

0.01

0.91

< 0.001

Condition X Conviction

(1, 46)

1.14

0.30

0.02

Group X Condition X Conviction

(1, 46)

< 0.001

0.99

< 0.001

N = 50
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or
neutral); DV = words recalled; covariate = PDI Distress score, or PDI Preoccupation score, or PDI
Conviction score.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)
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Table 11. Exploratory Analyses: JTC Task & PDI Dimension Scores Mixed ANCOVA
Results
Condition X Subscale Interaction

Degrees of freedom

F value

p value

Effect size (η2)

Condition X Distress

(1 ,46)

0.20

0.66

0.004

Group X Condition X Distress

(1, 46)

0.38

0.54

0.008

Condition X Preoccupation

(1, 46)

0.34

0.56

0.007

GroupXConditionXPreoccupation

(1, 46)

0.12

0.73

0.003

Condition X Conviction

(1, 46)

0.06

0.80

0.001

Group X Condition X Conviction

(1, 46)

0.005

0.95

< 0.001

N = 50
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or
neutral); DV = words recalled; covariate = PDI Distress score, or PDI Preoccupation score, or PDI
Conviction score.
* p < 0.05
†statistical trend (p = 0.10)
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